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I 
INTRODUCTION 
n the longstanding debate over the proper place of the Treaty 
Power in the Constitution’s federal structure, on the one hand 
there are Federalists and on the other hand there are federalists.1 
During the ratification of the Constitution, many Federalists believed 
the national government needed an expansive Treaty Power to 
preserve the nascent union.2 Today, many federalists see such a 
Treaty Power as a potential threat to the sovereignty of the states.3 
Between 1998 and 2000, the Michigan Law Review published a series 
of articles by Curtis Bradley4 and David Golove5 on competing 
conceptions of how the Treaty Power fits in the Constitution’s 
federal structure. Bradley argued that federalism delimits the capacity 
of the national government to create binding national law through 
the forging of treaties.6 That is, the national government may not 
invade the sovereign province of the states by using the Treaty Power 
to circumvent the restrictions placed on the national government by 
federalism. In contrast, Golove argued that the national government 
 
 1. In this paper, I discuss the ideological positions of both the historical political group 
known as the “Federalists,” and modern-day legal philosophers known as “federalists.” 
Throughout, I capitalize the name of the historical political party and do not capitalize the name 
of the modern legal philosophers. 
 2. See WALTER STAHR, JOHN JAY: FOUNDING FATHER 242–46 (2005) (discussing John Jay’s 
ideal of a strong executive, especially in the international arena); THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John 
Jay). Secretary of Foreign Affairs Jay saw this as necessary even before ratification. STAHR, supra, 
at 186, 203. 
 3. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 
390 (1998); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867 
(2005) (reviewing textual, historical, and practical reasons for cabining the Treaty Power). 
 4. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, Part II, 99 MICH. L. 
REV. 98, 122–23 (2000); Bradley, supra note 3. 
 5. David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the 
Nationalist Conceptions of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2000). 
 6. Bradley, supra note 4, at 98. 
I 
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may use the Treaty Power to legislate in areas generally reserved to 
the states so long as the Constitution does not explicitly prevent it.7 
Unfortunately, neither author’s argument addressed the history of 
the most important constitutional event bearing on the issue—the 
ratification of the Eleventh Amendment. 
In this Essay, I make two arguments. First, I argue that the 
national government may not use the Treaty Power to abrogate 
Eleventh Amendment protections.8 The Eleventh Amendment 
voided specific provisions of the Treaty of Peace that states feared 
would grant British creditors actionable claims against them and, by 
cabining the Treaty Power, additionally prevented the national 
government from negotiating a new treaty that would have held 
states accountable for their denials of British claims. Whatever the 
original meaning of the Treaty Power was at the Framing, the 
Eleventh Amendment redefined and curtailed it dramatically. In fact, 
the Framers of the Eleventh Amendment saw the Supremacy Clause, 
and the policy reasons underlying it, not as grounds to tolerate an 
expansive Treaty Power, but rather as the very reasons to amend the 
Constitution. The background of the Eleventh Amendment as a 
response to the Treaty of Peace does not resolve all questions in the 
debate between Golove and Bradley, but it does provide a more 
complete picture of the constitutional balance between the national 
and state governments in light of the Treaty Power. 
Second, I argue that the states ratified the Eleventh Amendment 
to protect themselves from out-of-state plaintiffs—but only out-of-
 
 7. Golove, supra note 5, at 1078. 
 8. Throughout this Essay, I refer distinctly to the barriers provided by the Eleventh 
Amendment and those provided by state sovereign immunity, which is the broader constitutional 
principal partly expressed in the Eleventh Amendment, partly in the Tenth Amendment, and 
partly implicitly expressed in the Constitution. 
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state plaintiffs—with claims based on diversity or federal question 
jurisdiction.9 The states ratified the Eleventh Amendment in reaction 
to Chisholm v. Georgia but did so more as Chisholm pertained to 
British creditors than as Chisholm pertained to American, out-of-
state creditors.10 As a domestic policy measure, the Eleventh 
Amendment protected interests within each state and simultaneously 
cut short the emergence of a national court that could have held 
states accountable for practices that were discriminatory, corrupt, or 
dangerous to national security. As a foreign policy measure, the 
Eleventh Amendment expressed American outrage over Britain’s 
refusal to evacuate military posts in the Northwest and expressed the 
American refusal to pay debts to British creditors.11 To protect states 
from British creditors, the ratifiers of the Eleventh Amendment had 
to preclude British merchants from bringing treaty-based claims 
under either federal question or diversity jurisdiction. They did not 
have to preclude in-state plaintiffs from bringing federal question 
claims, because British merchants could not practicably assign their 
claims to in-state plaintiffs. Competing interpretations of the 
Eleventh Amendment insufficiently consider its purpose as a foreign 
policy measure.12 
 
 9. This interpretation is consistent with Lawrence Marshall’s methodology and reading of 
the text of the amendment itself. See Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh 
Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1342, 1346 (1989). I discuss Marshall’s theory in Part IV.A. 
 10. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (2 Dall.) (1793) (holding that American, out-of-state 
creditors could bring suits against states for money damages). See infra Part III.B. 
 11. In the Treaty of Peace, the United States promised that the claims of British creditors 
would be heard and fairly paid, and Britain promised it would remove its military forces from the 
Northwest Territory. See infra Part III.A. 
 12. See, e.g., William Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A 
Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against 
Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1130 (1983); see also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18 (1890) 
(noting the “profound shock” theory of the Eleventh Amendment); 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE 
SUPREME COURT IN U.S. HISTORY 101 (rev. ed. 1926). I discuss these theories more in Part IV.B. 
Although some thinkers have advanced non-historical interpretive frameworks for understanding 
the Eleventh Amendment, the Court’s decisions have emphasized history as the interpretive 
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In Part II, I outline the tensions in the relationship between the 
Treaty Power and state sovereign immunity. I begin by sketching out 
pertinent portions of the Court’s recent state sovereign immunity 
jurisprudence and its probable collision with the Treaty Power. In 
Part II.A, I briefly describe the text, structural placement, and history 
of the Treaty Power. In Part II.B, I summarize the positions of two 
camps on the Treaty Power: (1) nationalists, who contend that the 
Treaty Power may be used to abrogate state sovereign immunity; and 
(2) federalists, who believe that broad concerns of federalism 
preclude such abrogation. In Part III, I recount the history of the 
Eleventh Amendment as a response to the implications of the Treaty 
of Peace, the threat to the states of Chisholm’s precedent for British 
creditors, the War Crisis of the mid-1790s, and the political 
exigencies of Democratic-Republicans and Federalists. In Part IV, I 
explain the implications of this history for both the debate on the 
Treaty Power and the interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. I 
conclude that, regardless of any balance struck in the original 
 
framework with which to understand the Eleventh Amendment for over two hundred years. 
Christopher Hart & Mark Sigmon, Getting Past Originalism in the Doctrine of State Sovereign 
Immunity (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Journal of Constitutional Law and 
Public Policy); see, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 735 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. 
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65 (1996); Hans, 134 U.S. at 18; Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 
406 (1821). Remarkably, the Court has concentrated on historical evidence, despite a dearth of 
direct evidence on the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment—there are virtually no records of 
either congressional debates or state ratification debates. Marshall, supra note 9, at 1350. This 
reliance on history is a testament to the endurance of originalism, despite the many pitfalls that 
many authors have discussed. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, History ‘Lite’ in Modern American 
Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995); Larry D. Kramer, Madison’s Audience, 112 
HARV. L. REV. 611 (1999); H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659 (1987); H. 
Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985). The 
Eleventh Amendment is a provision so lost in history that it has been constructed and 
reconstructed based on purported original meaning in radically different ways. See generally Hart 
& Sigmon, supra. At times, these originalist intepretations have been palpably divorced from the 
text of the Amendment itself. William Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: 
A Critical Evaluation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1372, 1378 (1989). But, if history must guide the 
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, and there are few documents to reveal its historical 
background, then any reasonable interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment must at least reflect 
the prevailing political exigencies of the 1790s. Marshall, supra note 9, at 1355. 
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Constitution on the Treaty Power, the history of the Eleventh 
Amendment indicates that the Treaty Power may not be used to 
abrogate state sovereign immunity.13 I also conclude that the states 
ratified the Eleventh Amendment to cover only out-of-state plaintiffs 
bringing claims against states under federal question and diversity 
jurisdiction. 
II 
FEDERALISM AND THE TREATY POWER 
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has altered the 
balance of federalism by curbing Congress’s powers under Article I 
and the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Though 
the Court has so far only curtailed Congress’s ability to abrogate state 
sovereign immunity under Congress’s powers under the 
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment14 and Article I,15 
the Court might soon face the issue of abrogation through the use of 
the Treaty Power. The Treaty Power occupies a unique constitutional 
position because of its roots in two separate branches of government 
and its specific incorporation of state interests in crafting national 
policy. These unique traits underlie the debate over its use as a tool to 
abrogate state sovereign immunity. 
 
 13. Or, to the extent that state sovereign immunity and the Eleventh Amendment represent 
distinct sources of protections for states, the Treaty Power may not be used to abrogate those 
protections afforded by the Eleventh Amendment. 
 14. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination 
Legislation after Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 451 (2000) (discussing City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)). According to Post and Siegel, “Eleventh Amendment immunity, 
however, can be abrogated by legislation enacted ‘pursuant to Congress’s Section [sic] 5 power.’ 
The upshot is that the scope of Section 5 power has now become the measure of what federal anti-
discrimination legislation may effectively be applied to the states.” Id. 
 15. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); 
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65 (1996). 
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A. Recent Federalism Jurisprudence and Treaties 
The Court’s recent federalism jurisprudence has circumscribed 
the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For 
example, in City of Boerne v. Flores, the United States Supreme Court 
began to demand “congruence and proportionality” between the 
violation of a judicially-defined right at issue and the remedy or 
prophylactic proposed by Congress.16 Boerne concerned the 
constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 
which Congress had passed to “restore the compelling interest test as 
set forth in Sherbert v. Verner.”17 In formulating its decision in 
Boerne, the Court sought to ensure that legislation passed pursuant 
to the Enforcement Clause merely enforces—not redefines or 
creates—substantive rights.18 The Court’s limitation on Congress’s 
Enforcement Clause powers in Boerne connotes where Congress may 
abrogate Eleventh Amendment protections.19 
The Court’s decision in Florida Prepaid followed Boerne. 
Congress passed the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy 
Clarification Act to explicitly abrogate state sovereign immunity in 
1992, and College Savings Bank, a business that financed college 
expenses, quickly filed suit against an entity created by the state of 
Florida that infringed on College Savings Bank’s business 
methodology.20 Having already required Congress to indicate 
explicitly its intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity,21 and 
 
 16. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 508. 
 17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (1994). The compelling interest test refers to state action 
infringing on religious freedom. 
 18. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 508. 
 19. Post & Siegel, supra note 14, at 451. 
 20. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 630–31. 
 21. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985). 
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having already held that Congress generally could not abrogate state 
sovereign immunity when legislating solely under its Article I 
powers,22 the Court in Florida Prepaid struck down Congress’s 
statutory abrogation of state sovereign immunity under the 
Fourteenth Amendment because Congress had not produced a 
legislative record sufficient to justify remedial efforts.23 
Would the law struck down in Florida Prepaid have fared any 
better if had it been cast as a statute enforcing a treaty or simply as a 
self-executing treaty—not as a mere statute? Today, few treaties 
include provisions granting causes of action against states.24 Yet, the 
national government has contemplated and even ratified such 
treaties. In the early 1950s, the Truman Administration began 
negotiating a human rights covenant that would have protected the 
civil liberties of individuals within the United States beyond what the 
United States Supreme Court then required under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.25 In response to these negotiations, Senator John 
Bricker (R-Oh.) sought to curtail the Treaty Power by constitutional 
amendment.26 In 1954, he came within one vote of passing a 
resolution in the Senate to cabin the Treaty Power’s domestic 
 
 22. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65 (1996). But see Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. 
Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 126 S. Ct. 990, 995–1005 (2006) (discussing how the Bankruptcy Clause does 
not implicate the same kind of state sovereign power as other Article I powers and hence does not 
implicate sovereign immunity notwithstanding Seminole Tribe); Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. 
v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004). 
 23. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 628. Similar results have been reached in several other cases. See, 
e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 
356 (2001). 
 24. These few treaties include the Warsaw Convention, the Convention on International 
Civil Aviation, and the Bilateral Air Transport Service Agreement between Panama and the 
United States. Cory Eichhorn, Comment, Eleventh Amendment Immunity Jurisprudence in an Era 
of Globalization: The Tension Between State Sovereign Rights and Federal Treaty Obligations, 32 U. 
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 523, 535 (2001). 
 25. Golove, supra note 5, at 1274. 
 26. Id. at 1275. 
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legislative scope within those subject matters that Congress otherwise 
may govern under Article I, section 8.27 Forty years later, these 
human rights treaties came back into fashion. In the early 1990s, the 
United States ratified three human rights treaties: the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Torture Convention, and 
the Race Convention.28 In none of these treaties does the United 
States outline a comprehensive enforcement scheme to remedy 
violations of human rights by states within the United States, and in 
none of these treaties did the Senate foreclose a remedy under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, which protects treaty-based rights.29 Hence, these 
treaties might be enforceable against state organs and officers under 
§ 1983.30 But could the Treaty Power be used to take the last step—
making states themselves, not just their organs and officers, liable for 
violations of civil rights?31 
When Congress abrogates state sovereign immunity, and thereby 
allows claims against a state, Congress seeks to remedy and prevent 
violations of important rights. Yet, the Eleventh Amendment 
delimits the statutory remedies afforded to individuals. Should 
remedies created through the Treaty Power be different—impervious 
to Eleventh Amendment qualifications? Among scholars, a lively 
debate continues over the proper balance between the Treaty Power 
and federalism. 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. David Sloss, Ex Parte Young and Federal Remedies for Human Rights Treaty Violations, 
75 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1107–08 (2000). 
 29. Id. at 1142. 
 30. Id. at 1142–44, 1154–55. 
 31. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996). 
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B. The Treaty Power: Text, Structure, and History 
The Treaty Power is special. Unlike other powers of the national 
government, it is neither exclusively legislative nor executive in 
nature, but has components of both.32 Under the Constitution, the 
power to make treaties is entrusted to the President and the Senate: 
“[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the 
Senators present concur.”33 Treaties are also mentioned in the 
Supremacy Clause of Article VI: “This Constitution, and the Laws of 
the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all 
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the 
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”34 Under the 
 
 32. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 245 (1997); Susan Bandes, Comment, Treaties, Sovereign Immunity, and ‘The Plan 
of the Convention,’ 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 743, 748 (2002); see THE FEDERALIST NO. 64 (John Jay), NO. 
75 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 33. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 34. Id. art. VI, § 2. According to constitutional doctrine, only self-executing treaties are 
“supreme” under Article VI. Golove, supra note 5, at 1311. Yet, Congress may pass legislation 
implementing non-self-executing treaties under the Necessary and Proper Clause, even if that 
means legislating on issues outside of its powers but for the treaty. Golove, supra note 5, at 1099–
1100, 1311–12. Ever since Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), this structural argument has 
included the role of the Necessary and Proper Clause. In this Essay, use of the “Treaty Power” 
denotes either the creation of a self-executing treaty or the passage of implementing legislation 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause, because the analysis for investigating whether laws 
passed by Congress to execute treaties are subject to the Eleventh Amendment essentially runs 
parallel to the analysis for whether self-executing treaties are subject to the Eleventh Amendment. 
Generally, statutes creating claims against states are not permissible. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. 
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65 (1996). Yet, Congress may pass such laws under some circumstances, even 
beyond their Enforcement Clause powers. See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 126 S. 
Ct. 990, 995–1005 (2006). In fact, Katz fits squarely within the Treaty Power nationalist camp. It 
regards the Eleventh Amendment as a reiteration of the original understanding of the federal-
state balance, but concludes that the Framing extinguished at least some aspects of state 
sovereignty, including sovereign power in bankruptcy proceedings. Id. Treaty Power nationalists 
certainly make similar claims about how states surrendered sovereignty over international affairs 
to the national government during the Framing. See infra Part II.C.1. 
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original, unamended Constitution, the judicial power of the United 
States extended to cases under treaties.35 
The Treaty Power is also special because of its placement within 
the structure of the Constitution and its notable, practical differences 
from the legislative powers described in Article I. These structural 
aspects convey its distinctiveness among governmental powers.36 The 
Treaty Power is not found in Article I, which addresses the legislative 
branch, but in Article II, which addresses the executive branch.37 
Though Article I does contain some language relevant to treaties, it 
simply and explicitly prevents states from negotiating international 
matters.38 
The different procedural requirements for creating a treaty vis-à-
vis a statute also suggest the special status of the Treaty Power. There 
are two routes by which a normal piece of congressional legislation 
may become law. First, it may be passed by both houses of Congress 
and signed by the President.39 Second, it may be passed by two thirds 
of both houses over a President’s veto.40 These routes are each 
different from the requirements for passage of a treaty, which 
requires a supermajority of present Senators and, in all 
circumstances, the President’s concurrence.41 As a general matter, 
 
 35. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 36. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 22 
(1969); see generally Akhil Reed Amar, Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26 (2000); 
Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999). 
 37. See U.S. CONST. arts. I–II. 
 38. Id. art. I, § 10 (“No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation.”). 
 39. Id. art. I, § 7. 
 40. Id. art. I, § 8. 
 41. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Golove, supra note 5, at 1299. 
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these requirements make it far more difficult to pass treaties than 
normal legislation.42 
Both the text and structure of the Treaty Power reflect the 
historical developments of the United States. Under the Articles of 
Confederation, the national government had tremendous difficulties 
in binding states to duties that the national government had 
negotiated in treaties.43 The Framers of the Constitution drew three 
principal lessons from these difficulties. First, practical vetoes by 
individual states on the enforcement of treaties could create severe 
embarrassment and even war if states failed to live up to the promises 
made by the national government.44 Second, the national government 
needed enough power to ensure that the international obligations it 
negotiated would be observed by the states.45 Third, treaties 
absolutely had to supersede conflicting provisions of state law.46 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs John Jay crystallized these lessons in a 
report to the Continental Congress on October 13, 1786.47 Jay’s 
report focused on how the states had expressly delegated their power 
over foreign affairs to Congress and could no longer participate in 
 
 42. Golove, supra note 5, at 1299. Because treaties are so difficult to pass, congressional-
executive agreements, which require the same procedures as normal legislation, have become 
preferred in recent years as a method of creating international agreements. Id. at 1297. 
 43. Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaties and the Eleventh Amendment, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 713, 
728 (2002). 
 44. JERALD A. COMBS, THE JAY TREATY: POLITICAL BATTLEGROUND OF THE FOUNDING 
FATHERS 27 (1970); THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay). 
 45. COMBS, supra note 44, at 27; RAKOVE, supra note 32, at 26–28. 
 46. RAKOVE, supra note 32, at 173; Golove, supra note 5, at 1103–04; Vasquez, supra note 43, 
at 729. 
 47. JOHN JAY, CONGRESSIONAL REPORT ON ‘STATE LAWS CONTRARY TO THE TREATY OF 
PEACE’ (1786), reprinted in 2 THE EMERGING NATION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, 1780–
1789, at 333, 334 (Mary A. Guinta and J. Dane Hartgrove eds., Wash. Nat’l Historical Publ’ns and 
Records Comm’n) (1996) [hereinafter Jay Report]. 
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foreign affairs except through their congressional delegates.48 In 
addition to having delegated their power, Jay argued that the states 
were incompetent to make treaties.49 In his report, Jay specified and 
evaluated the state laws that, according to British diplomats, violated 
the Treaty of Peace.50 Finally, Jay outlined a legislative program to 
repeal in a uniform manner state laws contradicting the Treaty of 
Peace.51 Although the report languished in Congress for months, it 
was eventually turned into legislation in March of 1787, and weeks 
later its concerns prompted the framing of the Supremacy Clause and 
the Treaty Power.52 
The Supremacy Clause establishes the Constitution, federal 
statutes passed under the Constitution, and treaties made under 
authority of the United States as supreme law.53 The Supremacy 
Clause notably includes as supreme law those treaties negotiated 
before the Framing, like the Treaty of Peace, that were made under 
the authority of the United States even if not made pursuant to the 
Constitution.54 Yet, to ensure that the national government did not 
use the Supremacy Clause to allow treaties to run roughshod over 
state interests (perhaps to the point of even surrendering a state to 
end a war), the Framers included the many procedural hurdles to 
 
 48. STAHR, supra note 2, at 203. Although this remark seems intuitive today, it was radical at 
the time. Id. 
 49. Jay Report, supra note 47, at 334. 
 50. STAHR, supra note 2, at 203. Jay concluded that New York, Virginia, and South Carolina 
laws contradicted the Treaty but could not determine whether North Carolina or Georgia laws 
also did, because he did not have updated copies of their laws. Id. at 203–04. 
 51. Id. at 205. 
 52. Id. at 205–06, 246. The congressional legislation caused most states to drop much of their 
anti-British legislation. Id. at 206, 296. In Virginia, however, whose debtors owed more than the 
debtors of any other states, the British still could not win relief in either state or federal court. Id. 
at 297. 
 53. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 54. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; STAHR, supra note 2, at 246. 
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treatymaking discussed above.55 Moreover, the Framers placed the 
duty of advice and consent in the Senate, with its equal 
representation of states, rather than the House of Representatives, 
with its proportional representation,56 because they thought the 
Senate would better represent state interests on a national level.57 The 
Framers also protected state interests by adding a minority veto on 
treaties by requiring two-thirds of the Senate to concur.58 
These designs suggest that the Framers created a robust and 
expansive Treaty Power checked by procedural safeguards meant to 
incorporate state interests. But how does that carefully struck balance 
operate if the national government makes a treaty abrogating state 
sovereign immunity by promising that states will be held accountable 
in federal courts? Does the necessity of these procedural safeguards 
within the Constitution suggest that the Court must shield states 
from a power-hungry President and Senate? Or does the presence of 
these safeguards suggest that the Court should leave defense of state 
interests to the states because such strong protections and 
incorporation of state interests already exist? 
C. The Nationalists and the Federalists on the Treaty Power 
1. The Nationalist Position 
Treaty Power nationalists argue that the Treaty Power should be 
available to abrogate state sovereign immunity for several reasons: 
 
 55. EDWARD S. CORWIN, NATIONAL SUPREMACY 65–67 (1913); Golove, supra note 5, at 
1135; Vazquez, supra note 43, at 728. 
 56. CORWIN, supra note 55, at 65–67; Golove, supra note 5, at 1135. 
 57. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 168 (2d ed. 
1996); RAKOVE, supra note 32, at 170; Bradley, supra note 3, at 412. Now, with control over 
congressional redistricting in the hands of state legislatures, it may be more accurate, albeit 
cynical, to say that U.S. Representatives, not Senators, best represent state interests at the national 
level. 
 58. Golove, supra note 5, at 1296–97. 
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(1) treaties are part of “foreign affairs exceptionalism;” (2) the 
inclusion of states in the treatymaking process fulfills the need to 
recognize state interests; and (3) federalism is not an explicit 
provision of the Constitution, and therefore cannot curb the Treaty 
Power under Court doctrine. 
The first major argument of Treaty Power nationalists is that 
foreign affairs are so delicate and important that state sovereign 
immunity should not challenge the dominance of the national 
government in the arena of foreign affairs. Justice James Wilson 
wrote in Chisholm that, “as to the purposes of the Union,” the states 
are not sovereign.59 Even though the Eleventh Amendment nullified 
Chisholm, modern Treaty Power nationalists have attempted to 
resurrect Wilson’s idea by emphasizing the importance of the Treaty 
Power to the national government. According to Eichhorn: 
The Supreme Court should not set forth a plan that allows states 
to avail themselves of their Eleventh Amendment immunity in 
the face of international obligations because of the traditional 
view of treaties as a uniform law which all states must abide, the 
possibility of private actors having no forum to enforce their 
rights, and the serious consequences that such a decision could 
have on international trade and the United States’ position as a 
world power.60 
Because of the potentially serious consequences of breaking 
international promises, nations are generally not permitted under 
international law to invoke constitutional restrictions, including 
federal structure, as an excuse for breach.61 
 
 59. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 457 (1793). 
 60. Eichhorn, supra note 24, at 534; see Scott Dodson, The Metes and Bounds of State 
Sovereign Immunity, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 721, 755–56 (2002) (discussing how treaties might 
abrogate state sovereign immunity more appropriately and easily than federal statutes). 
 61. Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 
403, 450 (2003). According to Professor Swaine, “[n]ations with federal systems should consider 
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Professor Bandes agrees with Eichhorn’s conclusion based not on 
foreign affairs exceptionalism, but because of a second reason—the 
incorporation of state interests into the treatymaking process.62 
According to this argument, the designation of the Senate as the 
ratifying body and the minority veto in that body both prevent easy 
treatymaking.63 The Senate was an especially state-oriented body 
before ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, because 
state legislatures, not statewide popular elections, chose U.S. 
Senators.64 If each state has its say in the formation of treaties, no 
state should be able to evade its responsibility under those treaties. 
The third major thread of nationalist thought on the Treaty 
Power derives from Court doctrine, chiefly Missouri v. Holland.65 In 
Holland, the Court addressed the power of the national government 
to regulate intrastate affairs, such as wildlife management.66 Justice 
Holmes’ opinion in Missouri v. Holland blesses the nationalist view, 
suggesting that general concerns of federalism cannot hamper the 
ability of a modern, unified nation to act in the international 
community, because the Constitution must respond to the 
experiences of the nation.67 Holmes, a veteran of the Civil War, 
invoked that crisis in his opinion: 
It was enough for [the States] to realize or to hope that they had 
created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their 
successors much sweat and blood to prove that they created a 
 
the compatibility of treaties with their constitutional orders before concluding them, because any 
errors are almost certainly not a basis for extricating themselves afterward.” Id. at 456. 
 62. Bandes, supra note 32, at 748–49. 
 63. HENKIN, supra note 57; Bradley, supra note 3, at 412; Golove, supra note 5, at 1098–99, 
1296–97. 
 64. Golove, supra note 5, at 1098. 
 65. 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
 66. Id. at 432. 
 67. See id. at 433–34. 
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nation. . . . The treaty in question does not contravene any 
prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution. The only 
question is whether it is forbidden by some invisible radiation 
from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment. We must 
consider what this country has become in deciding what that 
Amendment has reserved.68 
Trumpeting Holland, Treaty Power nationalists contend that 
unwritten portions of the Constitution, like structural federalism, 
have no bearing on the responsibilities of the United States to keep 
its promises in the international community69—federalism is merely 
an “invisible radiation” of the Tenth Amendment.70 
By concentrating on the Tenth Amendment and ignoring the 
explicit “prohibitory words” of the Eleventh Amendment,71 this 
doctrinal argument cleverly avoids federalism as a constitutional 
restriction on the Treaty Power. It is clear under Reid v. Covert that 
the national government may not use the Treaty Power to 
circumvent explicit constitutional prohibitions.72 For example, a 
treaty may not raise revenue, because only the House of 
Representatives may propose laws raising revenue.73 In Reid, the 
Court reversed the conviction of a non-military U.S. citizen tried by a 
U.S. military court in Britain acting without a jury pursuant to an 
executive agreement.74 That action violated the defendant’s 
 
 68. Id. (emphasis added). 
 69. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957); Swaine, supra note 61, at 449. 
 70. Golove, supra note 5, at 1257–66. The Tenth Amendment reads: “The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved 
to the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 71. Or by adopting a “diversity” theory of the Eleventh Amendment (i.e., the Eleventh 
Amendment was not meant to address federal question jurisdiction, but merely diversity 
jurisdiction.). See William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A 
Reply to Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1261 (1989). 
 72. Reid, 354 U.S. at 17; CORWIN, supra note 55, at 10; Golove, supra note 5, at 1084, 1097. 
 73. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; HENKIN, supra note 57, at 203. 
 74. Reid, 354 U.S. at 16. 
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constitutional right to trial by jury under the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments.75 
But, even if the “invisible radiation” of federalism found in the 
Tenth Amendment—and the rest of the Constitution’s structure—
does not trigger barriers to treatymaking, as Reid and Holland appear 
to hold,76 federalism as articulated in the words of the Eleventh 
Amendment should. If the explicitness tests of Missouri and Reid 
determine what is and is not a barrier to treatymaking, the Eleventh 
Amendment clearly constitutes a visible radiation of federalism—its 
text represents such “prohibitory words” that explicitly enunciate 
federalism as a barrier to treatymaking, at least concerning state 
liability to out-of-state plaintiffs in federal court. 
2. The Federalist Position 
The most recent round of debate surrounding the Treaty Power’s 
relationship to federalism began with Bradley’s articles critiquing the 
nationalist view.77 Bradley contends that “if federalism is to be the 
subject of judicial protection—as the current Supreme Court appears 
to believe—there is no justification for giving the treaty power special 
immunity from such protection.”78 Bradley’s conception of 
federalism deals with the implicit structure and history of the 
Constitution and Tenth Amendment as well as current 
interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment.79 
 
 75. Id. at 8. 
 76. Id. at 18 (“There is nothing in Missouri v. Holland which is contrary to the position taken 
here. There the Court carefully noted that the treaty involved was not inconsistent with any 
specific provision of the Constitution.”) (citation omitted). 
 77. See Bradley, supra note 4; Bradley, supra note 3. 
 78. Bradley, supra note 3, at 394. 
 79. Id. at 434–50. 
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Treaty Power federalists contend that the implicit constitutional 
restriction of federalism must limit the Treaty Power just as express 
provisions, such as the Fifth or Sixth Amendments, do.80 In Bradley’s 
words: 
[This would] subject the treaty power to the same federalism 
restrictions that apply to Congress’s legislative powers. Under the 
approach, the treaty power would not confer any additional 
regulatory powers on the federal government, just the power to 
bind the United States on the international plane. Thus, for 
example, it could not be used to resurrect legislation determined 
by the Supreme Court to be beyond Congress’s legislative powers, 
such as the legislation at issue in the recent New York, Lopez, 
Boerne, and Printz decisions.81 
In other words, Treaty Power federalists would overturn Missouri v. 
Holland and reify the “invisible radiations” of the Tenth Amendment 
and the implicit, yet obvious, federal structure of the Constitution.82 
Bradley makes his argument through four discrete historical 
observations on the balance of federalism established in the 
Framing.83 First, the Framers wanted treaties to be procedurally 
difficult to make.84 Bradley argues that the heightened procedural 
steps required of treatymaking over ordinary legislation do not 
authorize Congress to overreach its legislative authority, but rather 
reflect ordained federalist barriers to national governmental power.85 
He contends that a federalist view of the Treaty Power would not 
 
 80. Golove, supra note 5, at 1277 (discussing Justice Black’s opinion in Reid v. Covert, 354 
U.S. 1 (1957)). 
 81. Bradley, supra note 3, at 456. This is essentially the same thing that Senator Bricker 
attempted to do by constitutional amendment. Golove, supra note 5, at 1311–12; see supra note 26 
and accompanying text. 
 82. Bradley, supra note 3, at 458; Carlos Vazquez, Breard, Printz, and the Treaty Power, 70 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1317, 1343 (1999). 
 83. Bradley, supra note 3, at 417. 
 84. Id. at 410–12. 
 85. Id. at 434–50. 
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prevent the nation from speaking in a single voice—that voice would 
just be different, accounting for every state’s input, and not raised as 
often.86 Second, the Framers meant treaties to govern only truly 
international relations—war, peace, and commerce. According to 
Bradley, treaties may not govern domestic affairs because allowing 
treaties to do so would provide a route for the national government 
to take sovereignty from the states.87 Bradley’s account contains a 
thorough history of subject matter limitations for treaties, starting 
with the Framers and continuing through the proclamations of 
Charles Evans Hughes to today.88 Third, the Framers chose only the 
Senate, not Congress as a whole, to consent to treaties because of its 
representation of state interests, not necessarily national, popular 
interests.89 Under Bradley’s theory, the states could protect 
themselves in the Senate under the Constitution primarily because 
state legislatures elected U.S. Senators.90 Finally, the Framers gave 
only limited powers to the national government in the Constitution, 
reserving the rest for the states.91 James Madison made such a 
concept, implicit in the Constitution itself, explicit in The Federalist 
Papers.92 
This is a remarkable argument for what it leaves out. Though 
Bradley relies on some Eleventh Amendment doctrinal principles in 
constructing his argument,93 he casts these arguments only as 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 410–12. 
 88. Id. at 413–14, 429. 
 89. Id. at 412. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 283 (James Madison) (Bantam Books 2003) (“The powers 
delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal Government, are few and defined. Those 
which are to remain in the State Governments are numerous and indefinite.”). 
 93. Bradley, supra note 3, at 458 (citing Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998)). 
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indicators of the Court’s evolving jurisprudence in the area of state 
sovereign immunity.94 Instead of discussing the history of the Treaty 
Power as originally framed in the Constitution or by the Tenth 
Amendment, Bradley could have relied on the history of the Treaty 
Power as redefined by the Eleventh Amendment. As evident from its 
history, the Eleventh Amendment contains specific prohibitory 
words that delimit the Treaty Power and support Bradley’s argument. 
III 
THE FOREIGN POLICY HISTORY OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 
At first blush, the text of the Eleventh Amendment seems simple 
enough: “The Judicial Power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another 
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” Yet the 
Eleventh Amendment is unusual among constitutional provisions 
because of the way the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted it. 
According to many scholars and judges, the Eleventh Amendment’s 
text does not control the jurisprudence of the principles it 
expresses.95 Rather, according to a majority of the Court, state 
sovereign immunity, which the Eleventh Amendment only partially 
expresses, affords protections to states beyond the text of the 
Eleventh Amendment. For example, these state sovereign immunity 
protections include prohibitions on suits against states filed by in-
state plaintiffs.96 Conversely, the Eleventh Amendment does not 
 
 94. Bradley, supra note 4, at 118. 
 95. See Blatchford v. Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991); see, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. 
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18 (1890); Mitchell N. Berman, et 
al., State Accountability for Violations of Intellectual Property Rights: How To “Fix” Florida 
Prepaid (and How Not To), 79 TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1046 (2001). 
 96. Hans, 134 U.S. at 18. 
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protect state officers from suits in equity even though the state can 
accomplish nothing except through human agents.97 This hodge-
podge jurisprudence has accreted over a century since the Court first 
disregarded the history of the Eleventh Amendment in favor of 
political expediency in Hans v. Louisiana.98 In Hans, the Court 
“transformed the Eleventh Amendment from a specific, ordinary, 
and written part of the Constitution into a paratextual loophole that 
allowed [the Court] to infuse into the supreme law a ‘principle’ of 
state sovereign immunity that was textually unmentioned and 
therefore amorphous, highly elastic, and manipulable at will.”99 Since 
Hans, the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment has never been 
simple. 
The apparent malleability of the Eleventh Amendment’s text is 
remarkable because Congress chose its words carefully. Although a 
resolution to amend the Constitution was initially introduced in 
February 1793, just days after the Court issued Chisholm on February 
18, 1793,100 Congress chose not to act on it for almost a year. The 
resolution was reintroduced on January 2, 1794, tabled, and then 
considered in tandem with several other potential constitutional 
amendments.101 Congress discussed changes to the proposed 
amendment, including making it purely prospective, a suggestion 
that was defeated.102 On January 14, 1794, the Senate explicitly 
considered whether claims arising under treaties should be 
 
 97. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 154 (1908). 
 98. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Particularly Dubious Case of Hans v. Louisiana: An Essay on 
Law, Race, History, and “Federal Courts,” 81 N.C. L. REV. 1927, 1933–34 (2003) (discussing the 
three major reasons why Hans should have no precedential value). 
 99. Id. at 1937. 
 100. STAHR, supra note 2, at 296. 
 101. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 25 (1794). 
 102. Id. at 30–31. This suggestion, like the proposal by Albert Gallatin, which is discussed 
below, would have allowed claims to be brought against the states under the Treaty of Peace. 
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exempted.103 Senator Albert Gallatin of Pennsylvania sought to 
amend the resolution to read as follows: 
The Judicial Power of the United States, except in cases arising 
under treaties made under the authority of the United States, shall 
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, 
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States, by 
citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign 
state.104 
The Senate rejected Gallatin’s proposed exceptional language.105 But 
why? The Eleventh Amendment is widely considered to have been 
enacted solely in direct response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling 
on state liability to American out-of-state creditors in Chisholm.106 
According to this popular account, the Eleventh Amendment was 
purely designed to save states money during a time of great debt.107 
But if the Eleventh Amendment was meant merely to protect states 
against suits by American out-of-state citizens seeking payment for 
debts incurred during the Revolutionary War, why did Congress not 
exclude treaty-based claims from those barred by the proposed 
Eleventh Amendment? 
 
 103. John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A 
Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1932–33 (1983). 
 104. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 30 (1794) (emphasis added). The fact that this language was 
considered and rejected has been considered by the Court in dicta. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 
706, 735 (1999). Gallatin here is clearly referring to the Treaty of Peace, as indicated by his 
invocation of “treaties made under the authority of the U.S.,” language that parallels the 
supremacy clause’s recognition of the supreme nature of the Treaty of Peace. See U.S. CONST. art. 
VI, § 1, cl. 2. 
 105. Only Senators Gallatin and Rutherfurd of New Jersey voted for Gallatin’s amendment to 
the resolution. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 31 (1794). Of the state legislatures that considered the 
Eleventh Amendment, only Pennsylvania and New Jersey, the home states of Senators Gallatin 
and Rutherfurd, refused to ratify it. WARREN, supra note 12, at 101. 
 106. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). See, e.g., NORMAN K. RISJORD, JEFFERSON’S AMERICA, 1760–
1815, at 339 (2d ed. 2002); STAHR, supra note 2, at 296; WARREN, supra note 12, at 96 (discussing 
the “profound shock” theory of the Eleventh Amendment); Berman, supra note 95, at 1045; 
Eichhorn, supra note 24, at 526–27; Fletcher, supra note 12, at 1045. 
 107. JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH 
AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 7 (1987). 
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Judge John Gibbons has attempted to square the rejection of 
Gallatin’s amendment with Gibbons’ understanding of the Eleventh 
Amendment by contending that Gallatin’s language was merely 
redundant and unnecessarily controversial and that Congress 
actually sought to preserve treaty-based claims.108 As discussed 
below, it is unrealistic to argue that U.S. Senators of the Federalist Era 
would see the potential redundancy of Gallatin’s amendment as a 
reason to reject it. It is more likely that the Senate rejected Gallatin’s 
amendment because Senators sought to prevent British creditors 
from bringing claims under the Treaty of Peace. After all, Chisholm 
had spurred British creditors to file numerous claims in federal 
courts.109 Moreover, the state ratification debates over the Eleventh 
Amendment occurred during an Anglo-American war crisis. This 
encouraged both Democratic-Republicans and Federalists alike in 
Congress and state legislatures to ride a wave of anti-British feeling 
by ratifying the Eleventh Amendment. In contrast, Federalist figures 
in the national government’s executive and judiciary sought to ease 
Anglo-American tensions through the immensely unpopular and 
unpopulist Jay Treaty by dealing with the claims of British creditors 
without relying on the states. In this way, the failures of the Treaty of 
Peace spawned both the Eleventh Amendment and the Jay Treaty.110 
To get a complete picture of federalism and the Treaty Power, 
scholars should consider the close ties between the Treaty Power and 
the Eleventh Amendment. 
 
 108. Gibbons, supra note 103, at 1934–36; Mark Strasser, Chisholm, the Eleventh Amendment, 
and Sovereign Immunity: On Alden’s Return to Confederation Principles, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
605, 620–21 (2001). Gibbons asserts, “The Gallatin proposal . . . was not needed, since the 
Eleventh Amendment in its final form excluded from federal courts only suits against states where 
jurisdiction was based exclusively on Article III’s grant of party-status jurisdiction.” Gibbons, 
supra note 103, at 1936 (emphasis added). 
 109. See WARREN, supra note 12, at 99. 
 110. See Gibbons, supra note 103, at 1899. 
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A. Revolutionary War Debt and the Treaty of Peace 
Treaty Power scholars argue over the Framers’ intent in crafting 
the Treaty Power. But the basis of the Framers’ understanding of the 
Treaty Power—the Treaty of Peace—grew out of a Revolution over a 
decade old at the time of the Framing. Treaty Power scholars should 
consider the causes and results of the Treaty of Peace in determining 
the original and subsequent meanings of the Treaty Power. 
The role of debt in spurring the American Revolution is well-
documented.111 Before the Revolution, the British Parliament passed 
several acts, among them the Navigation and Currency Acts, to 
solidify Britain’s grip on trade with the colonies and collect on the 
colonists’ debt to the Crown for protection during the Seven Years 
War and Pontiac’s Rebellion.112 These acts limited colonial trade and 
greatly increased deficits in the colonies.113 The amount of colonial 
debt owed to British mercantile firms grew wildly in the last ten years 
before the Revolution.114 In response to increasing trade problems, 
colonists retaliated against Britain commercially—Virginia’s courts 
even closed their doors to prevent the debt hearings that British 
creditors sought.115 In quick succession, commercial retaliation gave 
way to military retaliation. 
Debt—this time owed domestically and to countries beside 
Britain—continued to play an important role in American politics 
during and after the Revolutionary War. According to James 
 
 111. See, e.g., WOODY HOLTON, FORCED FOUNDERS: INDIANS, DEBTORS, SLAVES, AND THE 
MAKING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN VIRGINIA (1999). 
 112. Id. at 51. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Wythe Holt, “To Establish Justice”: Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention of 
the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1434 (1989). 
 115. HOLTON, supra note 111, at 126. 
04__SCHWAIGER.DOC 11/1/2007  3:54:10 PM 
 
VOL. 2 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW &   PUBLIC POLICY 2007 
 
? 242 ? 
Ferguson, “The war for independence . . . gave birth to Congressional 
functions requiring money expenditures and, most important, 
created a large domestic and foreign debt.”116 In addition to paying 
expenditures, Congress authorized the impressment of goods and 
services during the war.117 These widespread impressments further 
indebted Congress to many creditors, especially in states like New 
York that hosted a great deal of military activity.118 During the war, 
many states paid soldiers when Congress could not afford it and 
impressed both domestic- and foreign-owned goods for military 
use.119 
In the aftermath of the war, the states with the heaviest domestic 
debts, like Massachusetts and South Carolina, wanted Congress to 
assume their war debts.120 The political twists and turns of domestic 
state debt assumption caused fluctuations in the debt speculation 
markets centered in New York City.121 Of the many categories of 
Revolutionary War debt, domestic state debt was the best for 
speculation.122 Many domestic debts sold for pennies on the dollar 
and before long were concentrated in the hands of relatively few 
 
 116. E. JAMES FERGUSON, THE POWER OF THE PURSE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC 
FINANCE, 1776–1790, at xv (1961). Congress funded much of the war using loans, and by 1783, 
owed about $11 million in loan certificates to specific wealthy creditors of Congress, $17 million 
in final settlement certificates to soldiers and civilian creditors, and $13 million in certificates of 
accrued interest. STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM: THE EARLY 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1788–1800, at 137–38 (1993). 
 117. FERGUSON, supra note 116, at 58. 
 118. Id. at 59. 
 119. Id. at 180; FORREST MCDONALD, THE PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 50–51 
(1974). Several states, including Maryland, Virginia, and Pennsylvania, also authorized 
impressments. FERGUSON, supra note 116, at 59–61. 
 120. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 147. South Carolina was an exception to the 
pattern of lessened debt in the South. FERGUSON, supra note 116, at 212. 
 121. FERGUSON, supra note 116, at 256–58. 
 122. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 138; FERGUSON, supra note 116, at 270. 
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investors.123 Concentration was especially high for state debts.124 
According to Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, “Seventy-two 
percent of the North Carolina debt, for example, was held by a group 
small enough to have met in one room.”125 National assumption of 
state debts would dramatically improve the value of these debts.126 As 
part of the nationalization process, the national government would 
collect from debtor states and pay creditor states for their expenses 
during the Revolutionary War.127 This move was politically popular, 
because each state thought it would be a creditor when the national 
government settled the accounts.128 
On the whole, the Revolutionary War debts that the states owed 
to domestic creditors were not large or frightening, especially given 
the economic growth of the 1780s.129 On June 29, 1793, the final 
settlement of the state accounts for the Revolutionary War was 
completed.130 Only New York owed a substantial sum—just over $2 
million.131 The other states were either creditors or debtors owing 
anywhere from $100,000 to $612,000.132 By 1794, the national 
government had assumed most state debts, which at the time 
constituted over $18 million.133 At that point, the states altogether 
 
 123. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 138 (“$12.3 million in Continental securities for 
which there are specific records was held by 3,300 individuals, 100 of them holding $5 million of 
it, and another 170 holding $2.6 million more. In state debts the concentration was even more 
striking.”); FERGUSON, supra note 116, at 251, 273 (discussing the example of Massachusetts). 
 124. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 138. 
 125. Id. 
 126. FERGUSON, supra note 116, at 207–17. 
 127. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 120–21. 
 128. FERGUSON, supra note 116, at 212; MCDONALD, supra note 119, at 97. 
 129. GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 394 (1998). 
 130. FERGUSON, supra note 116, at 332–33. 
 131. Id. at 333. 
 132. Id. Massachusetts, the largest creditor, owed $1,248,000. Id. 
 133. CLYDE JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 69 (1972). 
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retained only about $8 million in domestic debt from the 
Revolutionary War.134 Hamilton projected that amount would be cut 
in half by the end of 1795.135 
In addition to drawing upon patriotic resources, states seized the 
estates of Loyalists and passed laws forcibly transferring debts owed 
to British creditors to state-controlled loan offices.136 By doing so, 
states began to collect on debt contractually owed to British 
merchants.137 Jay, Franklin, and Adams used these recovered debts as 
a significant bargaining chip when they negotiated the end of Anglo-
American hostilities in 1782.138 Although it is impossible to know 
how much value the potential claims had when the negotiations 
occurred, they were sizeable; even at the outset of the war, American 
debtors had owed at least $28 million to British creditors.139 
 
 134. Id. 
 135. James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An “Explanatory” Account of the Eleventh 
Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269, 1350 (1998). 
 136. Gibbons, supra note 103, at 1899–1901; Golove, supra note 5, at 1151. 
 137. Gibbons, supra note 103, at 1900–01. Britain was primarily concerned with impediments 
to debt collection in Virginia. STAHR, supra note 2, at 200. According to Egerton Ryerson: 
[H]ad Virginia especially been honest enough to have permitted the payment of debts 
which her people owed to British subjects before the war, the first years of our freedom 
would not have been stained with a breach of our public faith, and the long and angry 
controversy with Great Britain, which well-nigh involved us in a second war with her, 
might not have occurred. 
2 EGERTON RYERSON, THE LOYALISTS OF AMERICA AND THEIR TIMES: FROM 1620 TO 1816, at 142 
(1880). State juries and judges additionally reduced interest on pre-war debts and discharged 
debts of creditors that did not file timely, even though courts could not notify British creditors. 
Holt, supra note 114, at 1439. 
 138. Gibbons, supra note 103, at 1899. 
 139. Id. at 1900–01. In Hamilton’s 1790 report to Congress, he thought the state debts to 
British creditors would cost the national government around $25 million. MCDONALD, supra 
note 119, at 58–59. When a mixed commission finally dealt with the claims in 1802, the U.S. 
government paid out only just over $2.6 million to British creditors, a number far less than the 
potential value of the claims in 1783. SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES 110 (5th ed. 1965). 
04__SCHWAIGER.DOC 11/1/2007  3:54:10 PM 
 
VOL. 2 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW &   PUBLIC POLICY 2007 
 
? 245 ? 
To construct a lasting peace, Jay, Franklin, and Adams demanded 
the removal of British troops in the Northwest and American 
ports.140 In exchange for the evacuation of troops, the Americans 
guaranteed in the Treaty of Peace that “creditors on either side, shall 
meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value of 
sterling money, of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted,”141 and 
that Congress would suggest, but not require, state governments to 
make restitution for property seized from Loyalists.142 Not even the 
British believed that the most important states would actually follow 
Congress’s recommendation to return seized property to Loyalists.143 
Indeed, while South Carolina quickly moved to strike names off of 
the list of the banished and returned property to Loyalists, New York, 
Massachusetts, and Virginia were “neither merciful nor just.”144 More 
importantly, when Congress turned out to be incapable of making 
states open their courts to British creditors, the British kept their 
posts.145 
 
 140. STAHR, supra note 2, at 100. 
 141. Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. IV, July 16, 1782, 8 Stat. 80. Jay dutifully explained to 
Congress, which largely despised the idea of paying British merchants, that it needed to pay to 
secure evacuation of the posts. STAHR, supra note 2, at 176. 
 142. Gibbons, supra note 103, at 1900–01. Jay drafted these requirements and 
recommendations. STAHR, supra note 2, at 165, 297. Jay also drafted the treaty provisions to allow 
British merchants, but not American Loyalists, to seek compensation for debts incurred before 
the war. Id. at 165. Article IV of the Treaty of Peace dealt with British creditors. Article V dealt 
with American Loyalists. See Treaty of Peace, supra note 141, art. IV–V. Ultimately, Britain would 
pay many of the Loyalists’ claims but not those who had claims under the Treaty. See 2 RYERSON, 
supra note 137, at 174. 
 143. SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, THE DIPLOMACY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 235 
(Greenwood Press 1983) (1935); BEMIS, supra note 139, at 59, 72; COMBS, supra note 44, at 4. 
Parliament recognized this implicitly by appropriating money to give relief to Loyalists. BEMIS, 
supra note 139, at 72. 
 144. 2 RYERSON, supra note 137, at 141–42; see also CLAUDE HALSTEAD VAN TYNE, THE 
LOYALISTS IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 295–96 (2004) (describing the persecution of Tories in 
New York State). 
 145. COMBS, supra note 44, at 11–13; ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 126. The 
British kept their posts to maintain their fur trade in the region by protecting traders and Indian 
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British creditors turned to the federal courts. In the years 
following ratification of the Treaty of Peace, British creditors filed 
many suits against states.146 This put many states at substantial risk 
from British merchants seeking sequestered property and from 
American debtors who had paid their debts to the state loan offices 
instead of British merchants.147 Given the lingering hostilities 
between the United States and Britain, coupled with the amount of 
the claims against U.S. debtors, many Americans despised the idea of 
paying British creditors. Many states kept their statutory 
impediments to British debt collection or even enacted further 
ones.148 The already difficult situation for American debtors was so 
bad in the southern states that they considered leaving the Union 
rather than fulfilling their obligations under the Treaty of Peace and 
subsidizing security for northern states.149 
On the whole, the domestic state debts were not serious.150 In 
comparison, American debts to British creditors loomed large. 
Treaty Power scholars should consider that treaty-based claims in the 
Federalist Era represented the largest and most bitter-tasting debt. 
Valued at $28 million at the beginning of the war, debts to British 
 
hunters. COMBS, supra note 44, at 11–12, 91; ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 126. At the 
time, furs were extraordinarily profitable. Id. 
 146. WARREN, supra note 12, at 99. 
 147. Gibbons, supra note 103, at 1903. The financial burden would not be small. See BEMIS, 
supra note 139, at 110; Fletcher, supra note 71, 1273 (“Claims against the states under the treaty 
involved enormous amounts of money, sought by loyalists and British subjects, at a time when 
political tension with Britain was high.”). 
 148. STAHR, supra note 2, at 202–04. The situation was particularly bad in Virginia—its 
debtors owed more to British creditors than the debtors of any other state. COMBS, supra note 44, 
at 83; STAHR, supra note 2, at 203. While most states eventually began allowing suits by British 
plaintiffs, Virginia held firm, and neither federal nor state courts there offered help to British 
creditors. STAHR, supra note 2, at 297. Between 1790 and Chisholm, British creditors filed over 
one hundred cases against debtors in Virginia federal court. Id. 
 149. Gibbons, supra note 103, at 1924. 
 150. FERGUSON, supra note 116, at 336. 
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creditors with interest were nearly four times greater than the $8 
million in domestic state debts that existed before the Eleventh 
Amendment ratification process began. 
B. The Meaning of Chisholm 
Several of the Court’s earliest cases dealt with state debts to 
domestic and foreign individuals,151 but the case that most directly 
and quickly pitted the Court against a state after the Framing was 
Chisholm.152 Chisholm spurred the Eleventh Amendment’s 
ratification, as virtually all scholars agree, but it did so in large part 
because of its relevance to British creditors. Once Treaty Power 
scholars consider this aspect of Chisholm, they can better evaluate the 
importance of the Eleventh Amendment to their debate. 
South Carolinian Robert Farquahar had provided materials to 
Georgia during the Revolutionary War, but Georgia refused to pay 
for them.153 After Farquahar died, his executor, another South 
Carolinian, Alexander Chisholm, sued Georgia to recover the money 
owed.154 Chisholm initially sued in lower federal court but later 
 
 151. Indeed, the very first case docketed in the U.S. Supreme Court, Vanstaphorst v. 
Maryland, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 401 (1791), dealt with state debt to individual citizens. JACOBS, supra 
note 133, at 43. John Jay, then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, was selected by Maryland in that case 
to serve as an arbiter and did not recuse himself from presiding over the case. 5 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, at 14, 18 
(Maeva Marcus ed., 1994) [hereinafter 5 DHSC]. These debt cases were not traditional debt 
collection cases. In one set of cases—Vanstaphorst, 2 U.S. 401, Cutting v. South Carolina, (U.S. 
1797) in JACOBS, supra note 133, at 62–63, and Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793)—
states did not refuse to pay because of insolvency but because of irregularities or lack of proof of 
the underlying debt. JACOBS, supra note 133, at 70. In some of these cases, states ultimately paid 
the debt even after it became apparent that the Eleventh Amendment would protect the states. Id. 
In another set of cases—Grayson v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798), Moultrie v. Georgia, (U.S. 
1797) in JACOBS, supra note 133, at 63, and Vassall v. Massachusetts, (U.S. 1793) in JACOBS, supra 
note 133, at 62—states were impleaded, not directly sued. JACOBS, supra note 133, at 70. None of 
the cases concerned state paper, securities, or loan certificates issued by a state. Id. 
 152. 2 U.S. 419. 
 153. ORTH, supra note 107, at 12. 
 154. Id. 
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brought the claim in the U.S. Supreme Court under its original 
jurisdiction.155 Chisholm was represented by Edmund Randolph, the 
U.S. Attorney General, in his personal capacity.156 Despite not facing 
an opponent, Randolph engaged the Court with the fundamental 
questions that the case presented. He acknowledged that Chisholm’s 
position was unpopular and attempted to defuse populist paranoia 
over the erosion of state power by saying that “the prostration of 
State-rights is no object to me,” and that states “need not fear an 
assault from bold ambition.”157 
Georgia did not enter an appearance—it denied the right of the 
Court to hear the case.158 The Court ruled in Chisholm’s favor, with 
only Justice Iredell dissenting.159 Each of the four concurring seriatim 
opinions concluded that the Constitution authorized the Court’s 
jurisdiction over suits against states filed by out-of-state citizens.160 
Of the Chisholm opinions, Chief Justice Jay’s opinion especially made 
the states begin to fear their obligations under the Treaty of Peace, 
because Jay loudly promoted a powerful national government,161 and 
he had chosen to be on the Supreme Court instead of in 
Washington’s cabinet to do so.162 In addition to its controversial 
 
 155. Id. at 12–13. 
 156. Id. at 13. 
 157. 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 132, 134. 
 158. ORTH, supra note 107, at 13. 
 159. Iredell called the question differently based on his belief that a citizen could not bring 
such a suit against the government under British common law. Id. at 13–14. 
 160. ORTH, supra note 107, at 14–15. 
 161. STAHR, supra note 2, at 90; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay), supra note 92, at 14 
(“[T]he national government will be more wise, systematical and judicious, than those of 
individual States, and consequently more satisfactory with respect to other nations, as well as 
more safe with respect to us.”). Iredell also agreed that the judicial power of the United States 
covered issues arising out of treaties. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 435 (1793). 
 162. MCDONALD, supra note 119, at 38. In fact, Jay’s main purpose in sitting on the Supreme 
Court bench was to enforce the Treaty of Peace. According to Jay biographer Walter Stahr, 
04__SCHWAIGER.DOC 11/1/2007  3:54:10 PM 
 
VOL. 2 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW &   PUBLIC POLICY 2007 
 
? 249 ? 
content, Jay’s opinion was the only opinion published in a 
newspaper.163 According to Jay’s opinion: 
[T]he United States had, by taking a place among the nations of 
the earth, become amenable to the laws of nations; and it was 
their interest as well as their duty to provide, that those laws 
should be respected and obeyed; in their national character and 
capacity, the United States were responsible to foreign nations for 
the conduct of each State, relative to the laws of nations, and the 
performance of treaties; and there the inexpediency of referring all 
such questions to State Courts, and particularly to the Courts of 
delinquent States became apparent.164 
Even though the plaintiff in Chisholm did not invoke a treaty-based 
right and Congress had failed to provide the Court with federal 
question jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Justices, 
 
Jay was interested in being Chief Justice . . . because he expected the new federal courts 
to handle important issues, especially international issues. The state courts were still not 
allowing British creditors to recover from American debtors. Jay feared that, if the 
United States did not honor this critical provision of the peace treaty, Britain would not 
honor the provision requiring it to evacuate the forts, and some frontier incident would 
lead to a war. From his perspective, therefore, the most pressing problem facing the new 
federal courts was to enforce British debts, and thus prevent a second war. 
STAHR, supra note 2, at 272. Jay had already sought to use lower federal courts to enforce the 
treaty that he had negotiated. When riding circuit in Connecticut, Jay struck down a state statute 
he held to be inconsistent with the Treaty of Peace. Id. at 281 & n.25. Jay similarly had struck 
down a state statute in Rhode Island under the Contracts Clause. Id. at 291 & n.52. After 
Chisholm, Jay continued to use the courts to remedy wrongs enacted against British creditors. Id. 
at 297–300; 1 MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 159–60 (2d ed. 2002). Ultimately, the U.S. 
Supreme Court, without Jay, would uphold Jay’s decisions in these cases. See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 242–43, 245 (1796) (holding that Article IV of the Treaty of Peace nullified a 
Virginia law impeding payment to British creditors). Jay was able to avoid criticism after 
Chisholm in other cases involving states by having a jury decide legal matters under his guidance 
rather than issuing a written opinion himself. STAHR, supra note 2, at 309. In these cases, Jay was 
only partially able to assuage British concerns with the way that debts were treated in the United 
States. Id. at 312. 
 163. A Citizen of the United States, NATIONAL GAZETTE, Aug. 3, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, 
supra note 151, at 232 n.1. Jay’s opinion appeared in the Federalist paper, GAZETTE OF THE 
UNITED STATES, in August 1793. Id. 
 164. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 474 (second emphasis added). 
04__SCHWAIGER.DOC 11/1/2007  3:54:10 PM 
 
VOL. 2 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW &   PUBLIC POLICY 2007 
 
? 250 ? 
especially Chief Justice Jay, focused on such questions.165 In his 
opinion in Chisholm, Jay grabbed for further national government 
power by relying on the Constitution, not the Judiciary Act of 1789, 
for jurisdiction.166 Because three other justices also made this point, 
Chisholm formed the precedent that the Court had constitutional, 
not statutory, jurisdiction over treaty-based claims. 
Chisholm, and especially Jay’s opinion, threatened the legitimacy 
of state laws protecting American debtors against British creditors.167 
 
 165. After all, Jay had been responsible for cataloguing the problems associated with 
fulfillment of state obligations under the Treaty of Peace. ORTH, supra note 107, at 16–17; 1 
UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 162, at 157; see supra Part II.A. Since at least October 1786, 
Jay had espoused a strongly nationalistic view of the Treaty Power. STAHR, supra note 2, at 203. 
According to Jay, states could only participate in the treatymaking process through their 
representatives in the national government, and, once the national government ratified a treaty, 
“it immediately becomes binding on the whole nation, and super-added to the laws of the land, 
without the intervention, consent or fiat of state legislatures.” Jay Report, supra note 47, at 334. 
This vision of national supremacy was espoused by Randolph in oral argument in Chisholm as a 
way of preserving international peace and reiterated by Jay in his opinion. JACOBS, supra note 133, 
at 49. The year after his report, many of Jay’s Federalist friends incorporated Jay’s ideas into key 
clauses of the Constitution, including the bar on state treaties, the Supremacy Clause, and the text 
and structure of the Treaty Power. STAHR, supra note 2, at 206. 
 166. Years earlier, Jay had given a specific justification for the Court’s constitutional 
jurisdiction in cases arising out of treaties: 
Because under the national Government, treaties and articles of treaties, as well as the 
laws of nations, will always be expounded in one sense, and executed in the same 
manner—whereas adjudications on the same points and questions, in thirteen States, or 
in three or four confederacies, will not always accord or be consistent; and that as well 
from the variety of independent courts and judges appointed by different and 
independent Governments, as from the different local laws and interests which may 
affect and influence them. The wisdom of the Convention in committing such questions 
to the jurisdiction and judgment of courts appointed by, and responsible only to one 
national Government, cannot be too much commended. . . . The case of the treaty of 
peace with Britain, adds great weight to this reasoning. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay), supra note 92, at 14. 
 167. Many Americans were particularly nervous that the courts would force them to pay the 
British claims, because Jay had previously publicly stated that the confiscation of British debts was 
illegal and that the Americans had violated the Treaty of Peace as much as the British had. ELKINS 
& MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 395; see also STAHR, supra note 2, at 203–05 (discussing Jay’s 
belief that some state laws had violated the Treaty of Peace and had even preceded British 
violations of the Treaty). Part of this sentiment likely arose from the fact that Jay’s father, Peter 
Jay, had been an agent for British merchants and had earned his money by collecting debt for 
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The decision, though protecting a patriot of the American 
Revolution, set the precedent that the opponents of the Revolution 
could sue states. Among the populace, this generated widespread fear 
and anger that state treasuries were vulnerable to litigation by British 
creditors, Tories, and Loyalists.168 State treasuries faced a large loss 
from these claims.169 Some congressional delegates responded right 
away to this fear. Within days after the Court announced Chisholm, 
Massachusetts Representative Theodore Sedgwick introduced a 
resolution in the House for a constitutional amendment that would 
bar suits against states in federal court by any person.170 The next day, 
Massachusetts Senator Caleb Strong introduced a similar resolution 
in the U.S. Senate barring suits against a state by citizens of another 
 
British merchants. STAHR, supra note 2, at 5. In addition, Jay’s law practice in New York City had 
consisted primarily of commercial debt actions. Id. at 29. 
 168. WARREN, supra note 12, at 99. According to Warren, 
Although opposition to the Court’s decision was to some extent based on divergencies 
of political theories as to State sovereignty, the real source of attack on the Chisholm 
Case was the very concrete fear of the ‘numerous prosecutions that will immediately 
issue from the various claims of refugees, Tories, etc., that will introduce such a series of 
litigation as will throw every State in the Union in the greatest confusion.’ 
Id. at 99; see also Pfander, supra note 135, at 1278 (arguing that the “shock” resulting from 
Chisholm stemmed from a fear that states would be required to honor old debts). 
 169. See Gibbons, supra note 103, at 1900–01 (stating that, immediately prior to the War, 
American debts to British merchants totaled about $28 million). 
 170. STAHR, supra note 2, at 296; 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 365 n.61, 597. This resolution 
read: 
That no state shall be liable to be made a party defendant in any of the judicial courts, 
established, or which shall be established under the authority of the United States, at the 
suit of any person or persons whether a citizen or citizens, or a foreigner or foreigners, 
of any body politic or corporate, whether within or without the United States. 
Pennsylvania Journal and Weekly Advertiser 1, col 2 (Feb 27, 1793) reprinted in Fletcher, supra 
note 71, at 1269 & n.45. Congress could have later adopted this type of blanket amendment, but 
instead used words that only explicitly circumscribe the ability of only out-of-state plaintiffs to 
sue states in law or equity, probably in reaction to Chisholm’s legal action in assumpsit and 
Vassall’s equitable claim. See “The True Federalist” to Edmund Randolph, Number III, 
INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE (Boston), Feb. 6, 1794, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 253, 
256; 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 365. 
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state or a foreign state.171 State legislatures began inquiring into their 
state liabilities and evaluating the potentially dire state consequences 
of Chisholm.172 But reaction to Chisholm was not unanimous; rather, 
ultra-federalists loudly supported the decision, and even mainstream 
Federalist newspapers like the Connecticut Courrant and the Gazette 
of the United States responded to Chisholm favorably.173 Generally, 
reaction to Chisholm was partisan, with Federalists supporting the 
decision and Democratic-Republicans opposing it.174 In Congress, 
both resolutions were tabled, and Congress adjourned without taking 
further action.175 Chisholm had no immediate legislative impact.176 
Chisholm encouraged Tories and Loyalists to file and press suits, 
especially against states such as South Carolina, Georgia, Virginia, 
and Massachusetts.177 The most important of these cases was Vassall 
 
 171. STAHR, supra note 2, at 296; 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 365 n.61, 597. 
 172. 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 365. 
 173. John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action Against 
State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1413, 1435 (1975); see also A Citizen of the United States, supra note 163, at 232 (“For my 
own part, I have never yet heard a good reason assigned, why a fraudulent state should not be 
amenable to justice, as well as a fraudulent individual! for such we know there are.”). 
 174. Nowak, supra note 173, at 1434. State sovereign immunity was a contentious issue, not 
only between states, but within many states. For example, the strange and shifting responses of 
New York to a contract suit filed by Eleazer Oswald arose from political contests within the state 
legislature over potential instructions to the state attorney general. 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 
62–64. Even in Georgia, whose House passed legislation making it a capital offense to attempt to 
enforce Chisholm, political actors were not unanimous—the state Senate failed to act on the 
House’s frightening legislation. Id. at 135. Similarly, newspapers published tracts both for and 
against state sovereign immunity and its implications for foreign plaintiffs in Massachusetts. See 
generally 5 DHSC, supra, at 389–424 (presenting myriad articles that argue the merits and 
shortcomings of sovereign immunity relative to the plaintiff’s demand for payment from the state 
in Vassall v. Massachusetts). 
 175. Fletcher, supra note 12, at 1059. Vassall believed, perhaps correctly, that the Eleventh 
Amendment was created to defeat his claim against the state of Massachusetts. 5 DHSC, supra 
note 151, at 369. 
 176. 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 597. 
 177. WARREN, supra note 12, at 99. These states, with federal constitutional and treaty-based 
claims mounting against them, were later particularly ardent supporters of the Eleventh 
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v. Massachusetts.178 Vassall concerned Loyalist William Vassall, who 
had left Massachusetts during the Revolutionary War, after which the 
state seized his property.179 The state of Massachusetts auctioned off 
Vassall’s furniture and mortgaged his home.180 After the United 
States negotiated the Treaty of Peace with Britain, Massachusetts 
passed a law in March 1784 allowing Loyalists to reclaim seized, 
unmortgaged properties, but eight months later officially confiscated 
all mortgaged properties.181 Vassall sued, claiming he had been 
damaged by the state’s confiscation act, which Vassall claimed 
contravened the prohibitions against future confiscations contained 
in the Treaty of Peace.182 
When the Court issued process in Vassall in June 1793 on 
Massachusetts Governor John Hancock, the state legislature grappled 
with how to respond.183 The problem was that the clear language of 
the Treaty of Peace, which said “there shall be no future confiscations 
made,” conflicted with the express purpose of the later Massachusetts 
law confiscating Loyalist property.184 The legislature considered 
making an appropriation to pay the debt or judgment, seeking an 
 
Amendment. Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 61, 114–15 (1989). 
 178. In fact, Vassall was probably the basis for the original resolutions proposing the terms 
later adopted as the Eleventh Amendment. Massachusetts Representative Theodore Sedgwick and 
Senator Caleb Strong, who likely introduced amendment resolutions directly after Chisholm, 
might actually have responded to leaked news regarding the Court’s processing of Vassall, and not 
to Chisholm. See 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 365 n.61. Of course, the precedent of Chisholm gave 
teeth to the Court’s proceedings in Vassall. 
 179. JACOBS, supra note 133 at 60; 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 352–69. 
 180. 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 354. 
 181. Id. at 355. 
 182. Treaty of Peace, supra note 141, art VI. 
 183. JACOBS, supra note 133, at 61. Not all states were as reactionary as Massachusetts or 
Virginia. Despite the fact that New York’s state sovereignty was under threat from suit in Oswald, 
the New York Assembly, against the recommendation of Governor George Clinton, refused to 
pass resolutions similar to those of Massachusetts and Virginia. 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 63. 
 184. See Treaty of Peace, supra note 141, at art. VI; 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 355. 
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advantageous construction of the judiciary article, or seeking to 
amend the Constitution.185 But the patent, anti-British prejudice of 
Massachusetts, expressed in newspapers and legislative committees, 
prevented any real consideration by the Massachusetts legislature of 
honoring claims by Loyalists or Tories.186 In the words of one 
Massachusetts resident, “If [Vassall] should obtain what he has sued 
for—what a wide extended door will it open for every DIRTY TORY, 
TRAITOR to his countries liberties to enter.”187 Moreover, 
Massachusetts would be unlikely to win a favorable interpretation of 
the judiciary article, based on Chisholm.188 If U.S. Attorney General 
Edmund Randolph, who represented Vassall just as he had 
represented Chisholm, brought this case to the Chisholm Court, 
headed by Federalist and Treaty of Peace negotiator Chief Justice Jay, 
the Court would strike down the Massachusetts law as 
unconstitutional, making the Treaty of Peace and its assurances for 
Tories the supreme law of the United States.189 
 
 185. JACOBS, supra note 133, at 61. 
 186. See, e.g., Marcus, MASS. MERCURY (Salem), July 13, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra 
note 151, at 390 (“Let the freemen of Massachusetts but only hear, much more see, that the arm of 
a tyrannical power is uplifted to strike a blow at their liberties. . . .”); but see Veritas, COLUMBIAN 
CENTINAL (Boston), July 17, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra, at 390–91 (noting that the 
principles underlying the decision of a former Massachusetts Chief Justice weigh “in favour of a 
foreign citizen”). 
 187. Democrat, MASS. MERCURY (Salem), July 23, 1793, in 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 394; see 
also The Crisis, No. XIII by “A Republican,” INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE (Boston), July 25, 1793, 
reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra, at 395 (“For should it be admitted that the States may be sued in the 
Federal Judiciary, the numerous prosecutions that will immediately issue from the various claims 
of refugees, tories, etc. will introduce such a series of litigation, as will throw every State in the 
Union into the greatest confusion.”). 
 188. 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 361–64. 
 189. Id. Randolph advised Vassall that the Court would affirm Chisholm and strike down the 
Massachusetts law as contravening the Treaty of Peace. Id. at 364. 
04__SCHWAIGER.DOC 11/1/2007  3:54:10 PM 
 
VOL. 2 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW &   PUBLIC POLICY 2007 
 
? 255 ? 
The Massachusetts legislature ultimately decided to push for a 
constitutional amendment barring court jurisdiction over the issue.190 
The Massachusetts legislature passed a resolution urging 
congressional action in September 1793191 and forwarded its 
resolution to other state legislatures for their consideration.192 
Connecticut passed a similar resolution a month later and was joined 
by Virginia, South Carolina, and Maryland before the end of 1793.193 
Several other states began moving to pass analogous resolutions, 
including Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, and North Carolina, before 
being preempted by congressional action.194 At the beginning of 
1794, the U.S. Senate again considered Senator Strong’s resolution to 
amend the U.S. Constitution and, after giving itself two more weeks, 
finally came to a vote on the resolution.195 
The precedent of Chisholm threatened to turn the provisions of 
the Treaty of Peace into enforceable claims.196 Although the states 
could largely pay their debts because the national government had 
already assumed most of them,197 citizens became enraged over the 
course of the year after Chisholm that Americans might now have to 
pay those who fought against the Revolution. The pursuit of claims 
 
 190. JACOBS, supra note 133, at 62. The state failed to appear before the Court and 
continuances were repeatedly granted until 1797, when the case was dismissed. Id. 
 191. Fletcher, supra note 12, at 1058. This resolution differed slightly from an earlier version 
written in June 1793. Compare Report of a Joint Committee of the Massachusetts General Court, 
INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE (Boston), June 20, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 230–
31 with Resolution of the Massachusetts General Court, Sept. 27, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra, 
at 440. 
 192. Id. 
 193. See generally 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 609–11. 
 194. See generally id. at 612–16. 
 195. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 25–31 (1794). 
 196. Marshall, supra note 9, at 1358. 
 197. See JACOBS, supra note 133, at 69 (“[O]ver two-thirds of the debts of the states had been 
assumed by the federal government, and the state governments, for the most part, were able and 
willing to meet their obligations.”). 
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like Vassall, based on the Chisholm precedent, pushed state 
legislatures to suggest constitutional change in order to prevent 
payouts to opponents of the Revolution. Thus, contrary to what 
many scholars argue, the immediate political context of the 
ratification of the Eleventh Amendment was not the Court’s decision 
in Chisholm protecting American patriots,198 but rather Chisholm’s 
value as precedent to British creditors. 
C. The War Crisis 
The international context of 1793–95 compounded the already 
mounting anger and fear over litigation by British creditors. It is 
within this context that Treaty Power scholars should understand the 
ratification of the Eleventh Amendment in order to gauge its 
relevance to their debate. The Eleventh Amendment was an anti-
British act.199 
Anti-British feelings were widespread throughout the United 
States even before the war crisis.200 In April 1793, President 
Washington first heard that France and Britain had committed to 
war against each other.201 The United States proclaimed official 
neutrality between France and Britain but continued to supply 
 
 198. Marshall, supra note 9, at 1358–59. Many scholars have emphasized American creditors 
rather than British creditors. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES 
AND POLICIES 185 (2d ed. 2002) (claiming erroneously that Chisholm was decided in 1794 and 
that Congress passed the Eleventh Amendment within three weeks of the decision); Marshall, 
supra note 12, at 1378. 
 199. According to Clyde Jacobs: 
[I]n Congress, as well as in the state legislatures, there was strong opposition to 
recognition of any liability to reimburse British creditors or to make restitution for the 
seizure of Loyalist property. In fact, this was the transcendent political issue of 1794 and 
1795, when the Eleventh Amendment was under active consideration. 
JACOBS, supra note 133, at 70–71. 
 200. See STAHR, supra note 2, at 200 (describing British violations of the peace treaty and 
labeling Britain as “the main threat to American security” at this time). 
 201. BEMIS, supra note 139, at 95. 
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French colonies in the West Indies.202 After all, France had been an 
ally in revolution against monarchy, and the  United States had 
promised to protect French colonies in the Caribbean.203 But many 
people in northern states, especially those exposed to the frontier, 
wanted the United States to fulfill its treaty obligations so that Britain 
would no longer have an excuse to maintain its military presence in 
the Northwest.204 With British troops still in the Ohio River Valley,205 
Pennsylvanians feared further Anglo-American hostilities or 
incitement of Britain’s Indian allies.206 By the beginning of 1794, 
when Congress considered the Eleventh Amendment resolution, 
Congress was already primed to act on American ill-will toward 
Britain.207 
When it appeared that Congress would pass an amendment 
erecting new barriers to fulfill promises made in the Treaty of Peace, 
thus potentially endangering Americans on the frontier, it was 
Senator Gallatin from Pennsylvania (a frontier state) who suggested 
 
 202. Id. at 96–97. 
 203. Id. 
 204. STAHR, supra note 2, at 200; ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 126. This desire 
was voiced despite Britain’s already diminished military presence on the American frontier. After 
France declared war on Britain, Britain essentially abandoned its posts on the North American 
continent. According to Combs: 
The whole of Britain’s North American colonies now contained a total of thirty-five 
hundred regular troops, including those in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. The 
frontier posts were greatly undermanned. Detroit and Niagara had a few more than 
three hundred men apiece guarding the walls, but Michilimachinack had only sixty-one, 
Erie thirty-nine, and Ontario fifty-four. The fortifications themselves were in a ruinous 
state. 
COMBS, supra note 44, at 138. 
 205. ORTH, supra note 107, at 17. 
 206. This threat was vivid in the minds of many frontier Americans—on November 4, 1791, 
Indians had routed St. Clair’s Army and chased them back to Fort Washington on the Ohio River. 
ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 271. In response, many American leaders called for the 
British to quit their posts. Id. 
 207. Nowak, supra note 173, at 1438. 
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the Eleventh Amendment not apply to claims arising under 
treaties.208 To facilitate the removal of British troops from the 
Northwest pursuant to the Treaty of Peace, Gallatin sought to 
maintain the power of federal courts to enforce the Treaty of Peace 
against the states.209 He failed. Widespread hostility toward British 
creditors spurred passage of the resolution in the Senate without 
Gallatin’s exception for treaty-based claims.210 A week before the 
House voted on the resolution, word arrived that the British had 
issued an order allowing the seizure of American ships carrying 
goods from the French West Indies.211 The House, after some further 
discussion and proposed amendments, passed the resolution 
proposing the Eleventh Amendment to the states on March 4, 
1794.212 Both Democratic-Republicans and Federalists in Congress 
had overwhelmingly supported the Eleventh Amendment during a 
spasm of anti-British hatred. 
The uneasy peace between the United States and Britain 
continued to erode as tensions ran high during the spring of 1794 
over British troop placement in the Northwest and the British navy’s 
 
 208. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. Gallatin was also concerned that a new 
constitutional convention, an opportunity for French intrigue, would jeopardize the nation’s 
future. Gibbons, supra note 103, at 1935. 
 209. 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 600; Gibbons, supra note 103, at 1933. Gallatin may also have 
been concerned that, if the Eleventh Amendment was enacted, the national debt would further 
increase as the national government stepped up to pay off the claims of foreign creditors of states. 
Gallatin and Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton viewed the national debt very 
differently. Hamilton saw a national debt as an affirmative good because it could serve as liquid 
capital that, if properly governed, would help develop the country and be a “national blessing.” 
ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 116. Gallatin did not agree. SELECTED WRITINGS OF 
ALBERT GALLATIN xxiv (E. James Ferguson ed. 1967); RAYMOND WALTERS, JR., ALBERT 
GALLATIN: JEFFERSONIAN FINANCIER AND DIPLOMAT 60 (1957). 
 210. ORTH, supra note 107, at 20. 
 211. Nowak, supra note 173, at 1439. 
 212. Fletcher, supra note 71, at 1290–91. 
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further interference with American-French trade in the Caribbean.213 
By March 24, 1794, Washington received word that the British navy 
had begun seizing American shipments and impressing American 
sailors in the Caribbean.214 Within days, Washington also received 
word that the longstanding tensions in the Northwest had come to a 
head—Governor Lord Dorchester had exhorted Indians there to 
prepare for war against the United States.215 
These actions stoked the fires of anti-British fervor in the United 
States, pushing the United States and Britain to the brink of war.216 
They brought swift and nearly unanimous responses. Democratic-
Republicans and Federalists, who did not want to appear soft on 
Britain, began to ratify the Eleventh Amendment in state 
legislatures;217 Congress pushed forward embargoes and 
sequestration bills.218 Two states, Rhode Island and New York, 
ratified the Eleventh Amendment immediately after learning of the 
British seizures and impressments.219 The British campaign also gave 
rise to a month-long embargo against Britain starting at the end of 
March.220 Weeks later, despite learning that Britain had established a 
new, less aggressive order, the House Committee of the Whole 
 
 213. BEMIS, supra note 139, at 99–100; ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 375; 
MCDONALD, supra note 119, at 135–37 (discussing, inter alia, British arming of slave revolts and 
allowing Barbary pirates to prey freely upon Americans as further reasons Americans despised 
Britain). 
 214. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 388–391, STAHR, supra note 2, at 313. 
 215. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 392; STAHR, supra note 2, at 313; see BEMIS, 
supra note 139, at 99–100; COMBS, supra note 44, at 91. Americans greatly feared a combined 
British-Indian attack. STAHR, supra note 2, at 200. 
 216. Golove, supra note 5, at 1116. 
 217. Nowak, supra note 173, at 1439–40. 
 218. BEMIS, supra note 139, at 100. 
 219. See U.S. Constitution: Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America, 
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data/constitution/amendments.html#f3 n.3 (last visited Feb. 7, 
2007). 
 220. COMBS, supra note 44, at 121. 
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passed an additional bill banning commerce with Britain on April 15, 
1794.221 
Foreseeing a looming military and commercial crisis, Treasury 
Secretary Hamilton implored President Washington to send Chief 
Justice Jay to London to work out a new treaty.222 Because Federalists 
were relatively powerful in the Senate and in the minority in the 
House, a treaty dealing with the debts would be more likely to 
succeed than mere legislation.223 On April 16, 1794, Washington 
nominated Jay as a special envoy to try to take the air out of attempts 
by Congress and the states to retaliate commercially against 
Britain.224 In doing so, President Washington sought to soothe 
relations by seeking a new treaty with Britain that did not rely on the 
cooperation of individual states or the House.225 
The American envoy had three major areas of complaint: (1) the 
British military presence in the Northwest; (2) the expansion of the 
definition of “contraband,” which resulted in increased seizures of 
American shipments to French colonies; and (3) Britain’s refusal to 
lower restrictions on American shipping to Britain.226 In the 
negotiations, the payment of debts and the evacuation of the posts 
were always connected, reciprocal obligations.227 Washington’s ploy 
 
 221. Id. at 122. 
 222. BEMIS, supra note 139, at 101. Jay had had extensive experience in foreign relations under 
the Articles of Confederation and during the start of Washington’s administration. He was 
Washington’s first pick for Secretary of State, but Washington granted his wish to be Chief Justice 
instead. MCDONALD, supra note 119, at 27, 38. 
 223. MCDONALD, supra note 119, at 106–07 (discussing that Federalists generally had control 
of the Senate, but not of the House, after the election of 1792). 
 224. COMBS, supra note 44, at 122. 
 225. Id. at 104; MCDONALD, supra note 119, at 106–07, 141. 
 226. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 377; STAHR, supra note 2, at 317–18. 
 227. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 397. Even after negotiations, when the Senate 
was determining whether to ratify, Alexander Hamilton continued to connect occupation of the 
posts with the barriers states had erected to collection of British debts. See id. at 434–35. 
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to use a special envoy to take the wind out of the sails of anti-British 
hysteria largely worked in the House,228 but one after another, the 
state legislatures continued to ratify the Eleventh Amendment.229 By 
the time Jay returned with treaty terms, ten more states had ratified, 
completing the procedural requirements outlined in the Constitution 
for ratification of an amendment.230 
The political test of the Jay Treaty did not reach Philadelphia 
until March 7, 1795.231 The Jay Treaty guaranteed that the United 
States would pay Britain for the bona fide debts contracted before the 
Treaty of Peace.232 The Jay Treaty itself did not address the debts 
owed to British creditors; that question was referred to a special 
mixed commission established by the treaty.233 The Jay Treaty also 
prohibited either the United States or Britain from supplying military 
aid to Indians in the border area.234 The treaty required Americans to 
exhaust their judicial remedies in Britain before referring their claims 
 
 228. COMBS, supra note 44, at 127, 135 (discussing how most congressional Anglo-American 
legislation got sidetracked after the Eleventh Amendment went to ratification procedures and 
Washington nominated Jay as an envoy); see, e.g., MCDONALD, supra note 119, at 142–43. 
 229. See U.S. Constitution, supra note 219, at n.3. 
 230. These states were: Connecticut, May 8, 1794; New Hampshire, June 16, 1794; 
Massachusetts, June 16, 1794; Vermont, between October 9 and November 9, 1794; Virginia, 
November 18, 1794; Georgia, November 29, 1794; Kentucky, December 7, 1794; Maryland, 
December 26, 1794; Delaware, January 23, 1795; and North Carolina, February 7, 1795. Id. at n.3. 
The Eleventh Amendment was officially added to the Constitution on January 8, 1798, when 
President Adams notified Congress that the required number of states had ratified the 
amendment. Id. 
 231. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 417. 
 232. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. VI, Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 
116. [hereinafter Jay Treaty]; ORTH, supra note 107, at 17. 
 233. Jay Treaty, supra note 232, art. VI; BEMIS, supra note 139, at 101; ORTH, supra note 107, 
at 17. Later, additional negotiations after the breakup of the commission resolved the debts. 
ORTH, supra note 107, at 17.  Ultimately, the Jay Treaty’s mixed commissions would break up, 
only to have another mixed commission finally resolve the debts. BEMIS, supra note 139, at 110. 
The U.S. government, not the states, paid $2,664,000 to British creditors. ORTH, supra note 107, at 
17. 
 234. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 410. 
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to a commission, even though British subjects who sought to bring 
claims against Americans did not have to exhaust such remedies.235 
Moreover, the Treaty prohibited the sequestration of British debts or 
legislation discriminating against British merchants, by then a long-
standing tradition in the United States.236 
As expected in a highly anti-British environment, the terms of the 
Jay Treaty were incredibly unpopular.237 Mobs burned Jay in effigy 
and threw stones at Hamilton when he spoke out for the treaty.238 
Americans generally believed Jay had paid too much for peace.239 
Given its controversial provisions, the Jay Treaty required some 
political maneuverings to achieve ratification. The Treaty barely 
passed the Senate, with a vote of 20-10.240 Treaty opponents, 
especially House Democratic-Republicans, sought to set up 
constitutional barriers to the treaty by demanding an independent 
House review of treaties requiring expenditures,241 but the 
appropriations passed the House without the review by three votes.242 
Britain abandoned its military posts in June 1796.243 Jay had saved the 
nation in an hour of crisis.244 
 
 235. COMBS, supra note 44, at 152. 
 236. BEMIS, supra note 139, at 102; COMBS, supra note 44, at 152. 
 237. COMBS, supra note 44, at 151–52. The question remains to this day whether Jay got a 
good deal. Id. 
 238. BEMIS, supra note 139, at 103. 
 239. Certainly, Jay was told to be prepared to pay dearly because the Federalists were so 
determined to avoid war, COMBS, supra note 44, at 133–34, but the threat of the Northwest posts 
was virtually eliminated before Jay returned, and without his knowledge, MCDONALD, supra note 
119, at 149. 
 240. BEMIS, supra note 139, at 103. 
 241. RAKOVE, supra note 32, at 357. 
 242. BEMIS, supra note 139, at 104. 
 243. COMBS, supra note 44, at 147. The British kept the posts until the treaty terms were 
funded by the House. Id. at 180. 
 244. BEMIS, supra note 139, at 103. Remarkably, in the end the Jay Treaty came to be almost 
universally supported. COMBS, supra note 44, at 173. 
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This crisis was not limited to the international arena. In fact, the 
Jay Treaty also allowed the U.S. Supreme Court to evade addressing a 
crucial and potentially destructive question.245 Ware v. Hylton,246 
which dealt with treaty-based claims, was making its way to the 
Court when the Jay Treaty established its mixed commissions. 
Because the Jay Treaty established an alternative forum, the case 
moved from the Court to the commission.247 Because Washington, 
Hamilton, and Jay had moved deftly and swiftly to negotiate a new 
treaty without the involvement of the states, the Court did not 
directly face the contentious question of whether claims brought 
under the Treaty of Peace were enforceable against the states.248 In 
this way, while the Eleventh Amendment defused the Treaty of 
Peace, the Jay Treaty defused the Eleventh Amendment. 
D. Bipartisan Support among the States and Congress 
Viewing the Eleventh Amendment in the political context of the 
partisan conflicts over international and domestic debt highlights 
how the Eleventh Amendment reaffirmed the vision of Democratic-
Republicans and cabined the Treaty Power. 
During the war crisis, Americans generally shouted for the 
fortification of ports, the increase of military spending, and the 
sequestration of British debts.249 Federalists and Democratic-
Republicans reacted differently to the burgeoning war crisis. 
Federalists tended to demand stronger defenses as a means to 
 
 245. Gibbons, supra note 103, at 1940. 
 246. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). 
 247. Gibbons, supra note 103, at 1940. 
 248. There were some related cases in the Court and directly related cases in other courts, 
however. See Gibbons, supra note 103, at 1949–56. 
 249. COMBS, supra note 44, at 121–25; ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 405. 
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peace.250 Although not prepared to declare war, Democratic-
Republicans were generally more hostile and pushed for commercial 
retaliation.251 These different positions stemmed primarily from 
different beliefs about how bad a war between the United States and 
Britain would be—Federalists believed war would be much worse 
than Democratic-Republicans believed.252 Hence, Democratic-
Republicans continued to antagonize British interests in state 
legislatures and Congress.253 Many Federalists at the state level also 
rode the anti-British wave, taking it to political victory in state 
legislatures and in Congress.254 But the most powerful and politically 
insulated Federalists at the national level—Washington, Jay, and 
Hamilton—sought to reconcile differences with Britain, secure the 
nation, and grow the national government through the Jay Treaty. As 
the states rushed to ratify the Eleventh Amendment, Washington 
rushed Chief Justice Jay to Britain to negotiate a new treaty. In sum, 
in ratifying the Eleventh Amendment, Democratic-Republicans 
reacted to the Treaty of Peace and Federalists relied on the 
forthcoming Jay Treaty. 
1. Democratic-Republicans: Ideology and Corruption 
The Eleventh Amendment was a Democratic-Republican victory 
over the vision of government that Washington and Jay espoused 
both officially and personally. It particularly admonished John Jay as 
 
 250. COMBS, supra note 44, at 122. 
 251. STAHR, supra note 2, at 313–14. Leaders like Jefferson and Madison believed that Britain 
would not be able to wage war against the United States because of the vast Atlantic Ocean, so 
they were ready to antagonize the British more than their Federalists counterparts were. COMBS, 
supra note 44, at 79. 
 252. COMBS, supra note 44, at 130. 
 253. Id. at 127. 
 254. Nowak, supra note 173, at 1440 (“A vote for the eleventh amendment was consistent 
with the Federalists’ strategy of proving to the people that they were as anti-British as the 
Democratic-Republicans.”). 
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the negotiator of the Treaty of Peace, the most vocal proponent of an 
expansive Treaty Power, and the author of the most frightening 
Chisholm opinion.255 Chisholm reaffirmed the Federalist ideal,256 and 
Democratic-Republicans fought that ideal through the processes 
outlined in the Constitution. 
Some Democratic-Republicans supported the Eleventh 
Amendment for principled reasons,257 but state legislatures of the 
time also had baser motivations such as graft, venality, and revenge. 
Robert Morris, for example, believed that “state legislatures were 
generally immune to all considerations of honor and sound policy.” 
258 Under the Articles of Confederation, the popular assemblies in 
many states wielded essentially supreme sovereign power, with all its 
concomitant corruption and foolishness.259 In New York, after the 
Framing, rumors abounded that state legislators were heavily 
invested in state securities and preferred to pay themselves before 
anyone else.260 Throughout the 1780s, the collapse of trust between 
the populace and their representatives was a constant issue.261 
Discrimination against out-of-state creditors was not beyond the 
short-sighted and corrupt nature of many state legislatures after the 
Framing. According to James Madison, state assembly members 
 
 255. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
 256. JACOBS, supra note 133, at 71. 
 257. For example, the essays of the “True Federalist” marshaled a fairly cohesive intellectual 
rebuke of Chisholm. See, e.g., “The True Federalist” to Edmund Randolph, Number I, 
INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE (Boston), Jan. 16, 1794, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 238, 
238–43. 
 258. FERGUSON, supra note 116, at 148. Conservatives generally had little faith in state 
legislatures. Id. at 244. 
 259. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 10. Indeed, this may have been why state 
legislatures were not trusted with ratification of the Constitution. See id. at 31. 
 260. See FERGUSON, supra note 116, at 231. 
 261. WOOD, supra note 129, at 368. 
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easily lost sight of the community’s interest in favor of their own 
constituencies’ immediate desires,262 even to the point of enacting 
protectionist laws that greatly limited commerce between the 
states.263 He was deeply concerned that states would commit fraud 
against out-of-state creditors, thereby entangling the United States in 
disputes with foreign powers or commercial interests.264 State 
legislatures and state courts of the era were notoriously 
protectionist—Congress had to encourage the states to honor out-of-
state debts, even if those debts were owed to sister states.265 In 
ratifying the Eleventh Amendment, state legislatures might simply 
have given lip service to Democratic-Republican virtues while 
advancing less noble interests. 
2. Federalists: The Jay Treaty and Growing National Power 
Once Congress proposed the Eleventh Amendment in the midst 
of a war crisis, the Amendment sailed through state ratification 
procedures with widespread support from Federalists. This is 
puzzling because Federalists generally considered payment of public 
debt to be a sacred obligation.266 Moreover, there were many pro-
 
 262. Id. at 195; see also id. at 406 (“‘The acts of almost every legislature,’ charged Judge 
Alexander Hanson in 1784, ‘have uniformly tended to disgust its citizens, and to annihilate its 
credit.’”); MCDONALD, supra note 119, at 69. 
 263. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 24 (discussing how states were “hemmed in by 
the commercial regulations of neighbor states”). 
 264. JACOBS, supra note 133, at 14; ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 11. Jay felt 
similarly. See, e.g., STAHR, supra note 2, at 74; THE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay), supra note 92, at 
14. Indeed, this was one of the main motivations for creating a federal court system. Holt, supra 
note 114, at 1458. 
 265. See FERGUSON, supra note 116, at 225; Holt, supra note 114, at 1456–57. This 
protectionism was consistent with the mercantilist tendencies that were the hallmark of national 
political economies of the time. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 20. 
 266. FERGUSON, supra note 116, at 147; MCDONALD, supra note 119, at 65 (discussing 
Washington’s belief that debt repayment was a “crucial matter of honor”). According to 
Ferguson, payment during peace, even of speculators who had paid much less than face value, was 
important, even though states had steeply cut the debts during war time. FERGUSON, supra note 
116, at 244. 
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creditor Federalists in many state legislatures and the U.S. Congress 
in the mid-1790s.267 
Yet, because most state debts had already been taken care of by 
this time,268 Federalists could support the Eleventh Amendment as a 
shrewd political move to deprive opponents of a winning political 
issue,269 keeping Democratic-Republicans out of office and 
preventing a new constitutional convention.270 After all, Americans 
hated the British and voted their hatred, but if Federalists regained 
power in the House of Representatives and retained their power in 
the Senate,271 they could appropriate money for the British debts 
when tempers cooled without courts forcing them to do so.272  
Federalists might also have believed that the thriving state debt 
market would redistribute the state debt claims to in-state plaintiffs, 
thus nullifying any potential domestic protectionist effect of enacting 
the Eleventh Amendment.273 
On the other hand, if the states actually meant the Eleventh 
Amendment to bar state securities claims, Federalists might simply 
have bowed to political pressure.274 Each pro-creditor Federalist had 
a political incentive to protect his own constituency and in-state 
 
 267. JACOBS, supra note 133, at 4, 70. 
 268. Id. at 74; MCDONALD, supra note 119, at 51. 
 269. JACOBS, supra note 133, at 71; Marshall, supra note 9, at 1369. 
 270. Gibbons, supra note 103, at 1932–33. 
 271. Partisan identification in the 1790s was not an exact science, but Federalists generally 
had power in the Senate after the 1792 elections, but clearly lost power in the House. MCDONALD, 
supra note 119, at 106–07. 
 272. JACOBS, supra note 133, at 71; see also Marshall, supra note 9, at 1369–70; Nowak, supra 
note 173, at 1440 (“However, the near-unanimous Federalist support for the amendment is 
understandable if they believed that Congress would retain the power to grant such jurisdiction in 
order to effectuate federal powers and goals.”). 
 273. Fletcher, supra note 71, at 1281. 
 274. Massey, supra note 177, at 113. 
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creditors at the expense of out-of-state creditors.275 Though most 
debtholders resided in the states that owed them, the speculation 
market concentrated most state debt outside each state.276 According 
to Lawrence Marshall: 
As elected officials, the congressmen and senators who voted for 
the bill proposing the eleventh amendment were probably 
conscious of their constituents’ anticipated response to the 
amendment. In any event, they certainly wanted to create an 
amendment that would be ratified by the states. For the typical 
voter, the amendment as drafted was a relatively costless 
provision; it did not affect his right to invoke federal jurisdiction 
in suits against his own state, but spared his state from being 
subject to federal jurisdiction in suits by outsiders. Had the 
amendment immunized states from all suits, on the other hand, it 
would have directly affected in-state citizens, and might have 
triggered opposition.277 
The Eleventh Amendment protected states by precluding federal 
courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases with out-of-state 
plaintiffs, thereby allowing state courts, or state legislatures, to decide 
whether to pay the out-of-state creditors.278 In-state plaintiffs, the 
voting constituency within each state, kept their claims.279 
Regardless of why Federalists supported it, the Eleventh 
Amendment still allowed Federalist majorities in each state to pay the 
public debt, at least to most creditors and specifically to each 
Federalist’s constituency. Moreover, Federalists could support the 
Eleventh Amendment without further upsetting the British because 
 
 275. Marshall, supra note 9, at 1367–70. 
 276. See JACOBS, supra note 133, at 24, 71–72. Obligations by some states with large debt 
markets, such as New York, largely remained within the state. FERGUSON, supra note 116, at 258. 
 277. Marshall, supra note 9, at 1369–70. 
 278. Id. 
 279. JACOBS, supra note 133, at 71–72. The Eleventh Amendment does not mention in-state 
plaintiffs. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890). 
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Jay was simultaneously negotiating a treaty to rectify the dire 
situation. Hence, Federalists in state legislatures knew that if both the 
Jay Treaty and the Eleventh Amendment became law that the 
national government would pay the state obligations. Indeed, 
Federalists might have supported the Eleventh Amendment in order 
to limit Jay’s negotiating positions to national solutions.280 After all, if 
states would not pay British claims, the national government would 
step in, thereby growing in power—a boon to Federalists.281 In this 
way, although the Eleventh Amendment radically altered the 
national government that Washington, Jay, and other Framers 
envisioned,282 its passage was not simply a Democratic-Republican 
victory. 
E. The Unsung History of the Eleventh Amendment 
In the Treaty of Peace, Americans bought peace with promises to 
pay British creditors. Amid mounting anger at British military action 
and fear of litigation from British creditors, Congress carefully 
selected the wording of a constitutional amendment to protect states 
from a volley of suits filed by British creditors with claims under the 
Treaty of Peace.283 This was no mere coincidence. John Jay—
negotiator of the Treaty of Peace, critic of discriminatory state 
practices, influence on the new Constitution, and Chief Justice of a 
court claiming the power to hold states to account—had scared the 
states and Congress into passing the Eleventh Amendment. The 
states ratified the Eleventh Amendment to overrule Chisholm, which 
suggested that the Court would hold states to account for breaches of 
 
 280. See MCDONALD, supra note 119, at 144. 
 281. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 116. 
 282. COMBS, supra note 44, at 61. 
 283. ORTH, supra note 107, at 7. 
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treaties, by preventing out-of-state plaintiffs from bringing claims 
based on either diversity or federal question jurisdiction. But, 
contrary to what many legal scholars and judges contend, Chisholm 
did not directly spur the Eleventh Amendment, though it did lay the 
groundwork for a hysteria that indirectly resulted in it. States 
legislatures were not very worried about domestic debt; rather, they 
were concerned about debt to British creditors and by the specter of 
federal courts forcing them to pay those debts. 
The Eleventh Amendment was not a simple or knee-jerk creation. 
It responded precisely to a constellation of concerns within 
American political parties over contemporaneous international crises 
and competing conceptions of the nation’s new federal constitutional 
structure. That foreign policy history has implications for modern 
interpretation. 
IV 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE  
FOREIGN POLICY HISTORY OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 
Despite the fact that interpretation of the Constitution based on 
original meaning is fraught with challenges, originalism has become 
the language of debate on the Court concerning the meaning of the 
Eleventh Amendment.284 In the case of the Eleventh Amendment, 
these challenges are exacerbated because of a near total lack of 
documentation from ratifying state legislatures.285 Scholars 
examining the modern jurisprudence of the Treaty Power and 
Eleventh Amendment have thus based much of their analysis on an 
 
 284. Hart & Sigmon, supra note 12. Even Justice Antonin Scalia, a self-proclaimed textualist 
on statutory matters, has abandoned the text of the Eleventh Amendment in favor of historical 
explanations. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: the Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989). 
 285. Marshall, supra note 9, at 1350. 
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incomplete historical account.286 Legal scholars have generally 
mischaracterized Chisholm’s relationship to the Eleventh 
Amendment either by relying on incorrect facts or emphasizing the 
Eleventh Amendment’s seemingly swift, overwhelming ratification 
without considering its one-year delay from Chisholm or its role as 
an act of commercial retaliation during a war crisis. Some of these 
inaccuracies are understandable because leading history books fail to 
explain the Eleventh Amendment’s ratification.287 Other inaccuracies 
are understandable because Eleventh Amendment and state 
sovereign immunity jurisprudence is confusing and exhausting.288 
Finally, the relationship between the Treaty of Peace and the 
Eleventh Amendment is easily overlooked, despite having been well 
established by historians, because the Eleventh Amendment itself is 
cast in generic terms that do not immediately alert readers to its 
foreign policy implications. 
The Eleventh Amendment’s foreign policy implications can help 
legal scholars and judges understand the Amendment’s meaning and 
that of the Treaty Power. The history of the ratification of the 
Eleventh Amendment shows that its current jurisprudence is likely 
not well-founded in history and, further, that the original meaning of 
the Treaty Power, whatever it was, cannot fully control Treaty Power 
jurisprudence. The meaning of the Treaty Power must include its 
circumscription by the Eleventh Amendment; the original meaning 
 
 286. The incompleteness of the record has not hindered, and has perhaps helped, different 
scholars’ adoption of various interpretations of amendment. ORTH, supra note 107, at 28 (“The 
search for the original understanding on state sovereign immunity bears this much resemblance 
to the quest for the Holy Grail: there is enough to be found so that the faithful of whatever 
persuasion can find their heart’s desire.”). 
 287. See, e.g., ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116. Historians, for their part, might be 
reluctant to consider the history of an amendment so poorly documented. Marshall, supra note 9, 
at 1350. 
 288. John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REV. 
47, 47 (1998) (“As everyone knows, the Eleventh Amendment is a mess.”). 
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of the Eleventh Amendment should likewise include its 
circumscription of the Treaty Power. 
A. Interpreting the Treaty Power 
Treaty Power nationalists trumpet Holmes’ opinion in Missouri v. 
Holland to argue that federalism cannot limit the Treaty Power.289 
But Justice Holmes’ opinion indicates that prohibitory words within 
the Constitution can control the scope of the Treaty Power,290 and the 
Eleventh Amendment’s text specifies when federal courts lack 
jurisdiction over claims against states. The states ratified the Eleventh 
Amendment to nullify specific terms in the Treaty of Peace and to 
cut off the President and Senate’s ability to together authorize federal 
courts to hear cases against states. That is, in order to overturn John 
Jay’s vision of the Treaty Power, the Eleventh Amendment overruled 
the balance espoused in Chisholm that, as to the purposes of the 
Union, the states are not sovereign.291 The Eleventh Amendment 
specifically curbed national treatymaking power despite the then-
vigorous representation of state interests in the Senate to alter the 
supremacy of the national government in foreign relations. Hence, 
the Eleventh Amendment offers exactly the kind of prohibitory 
words that Holmes contemplated in Holland. Scholars like Golove 
and Bradley, who debate the nature of the Treaty Power, should 
consider this history. 
Treaty Power nationalists describe two principal problems with 
the application of the Eleventh Amendment to the Treaty Power: 
“limiting the remedies against the states generally undermines treaty 
supremacy and calls into question U.S. performance of its primary 
 
 289. See, e.g., Golove, supra note 5, at 1257. 
 290. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
 291. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 457 (1793). 
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obligations,” and “state sovereign immunity may breach U.S. 
undertakings directly relating to remedies.”292 Indeed, state discretion 
to exercise sovereign immunity against treaty-based claims could 
invite destruction of the Union.293 Thus, if the national government 
has negotiated a deal with a foreign power that governs local affairs, 
states cannot have discretion in their adherence, because that would 
invite a relationship between the foreign power and the domestic 
state.294 Under the Articles of Confederation, the United States 
experienced tremendous difficulty reconciling its treaty-based 
obligations and its constitutional structure.295 In no small part, the 
Framers specifically designed the Supremacy Clause to mitigate these 
problems in the hope that it would prevent these problems from 
dragging the United States into another war with Britain.296 
But the Framers of the Supremacy Clause did not have the last 
word on the national government’s power to make treaties. Whether 
believing in foreign affairs exceptionalism,297 or that states already 
have a sufficient role in the crafting of treaties,298 Treaty Power 
nationalists ignore an important motivation behind the Eleventh 
Amendment—to create exactly the problems that Treaty Power 
nationalists associate with states overruling international treaties. 
The Eleventh Amendment radically altered the balance struck at the 
Framing between the state and national governments, and Treaty 
 
 292. Swaine, supra note 61, at 438. 
 293. Golove, supra note 5, at 1098 (“[P]ermitting states to carry on formal diplomatic contacts 
and enter into separate relationships with foreign powers raises the prospect of foreign intrigue, of 
divided loyalties, and of conflict and competition among the states.”). 
 294. Id. 
 295. See generally Jay Report, supra note 47. 
 296. STAHR, supra note 2, at 205–06, 246. 
 297. Eichhorn, supra note 24, at 534. 
 298. Bandes, supra note 32, at 748. 
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Power nationalists have turned a blind eye to that history.299 Though 
the Eleventh Amendment renders treaty obligations problematic, 
that is no reason to allow the Treaty Power to undercut the Eleventh 
Amendment. Rather, it is a reason to allow the Eleventh Amendment 
to undercut the Treaty Power. 
Remarkably, federalists have also ignored this history, despite its 
support of their position.300 Bradley makes a case for limited Treaty 
Power by considering the invisible radiations of the Tenth 
Amendment, the unwritten and abstract notions of federalism, and 
recent Eleventh Amendment Court doctrine.301 Such an argument 
seeks to overturn or at least skirt around Holland, which allows the 
national government to make treaties that do not contravene any 
specific part of the Constitution.302 But federalists like Bradley could 
instead embrace Holland and its counterpart, Reid, which prevents 
the national government from making treaties that contravene 
specific provisions of the Constitution.303 By doing so, federalists 
could abandon the invisible radiations of the Tenth Amendment and 
unwritten notions of federalism to instead rely on the Eleventh 
Amendment as a “specific provision” preventing the national 
government from making certain treaty provisions. The specificity of 
 
 299. A particularly egregious omission is in a piece by Cory Eichhorn concerning the 
relationship between treaties and state sovereign immunity where he describes only the domestic 
implications of Chisholm. See Eichhorn, supra note 24, at 526–27. 
 300. See Bradley, supra note 4; Bradley, supra note 3. Bradley does treat current Eleventh 
Amendment jurisprudence in both of his articles. See Bradley, supra note 4, at 117 nn.117–24; 
Bradley, supra note 3, at 458 nn.379–84. 
 301. See Bradley, supra note 4; Bradley, supra note 3. Even if federalists accept Holland’s test, 
the history of the Eleventh Amendment demonstrates that it should be considered explicit 
prohibitory words. That is, the logic of Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), would recognize the 
explicit bar to federal court jurisdiction enunciated in the Eleventh Amendment. See Dodson, 
supra note 60, at 758. Indeed, in doing so, Treaty Power federalists could suggest an even more 
expansive view of state sovereign immunity against claims arising solely under treaties. 
 302. Reid, 354 U.S. at 18. 
 303. Id. at 41. 
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the Eleventh Amendment as a barrier to treatymaking, especially in 
light of its history as a foreign policy instrument, suggests it would 
fall on the Reid side of the specificity test rather than the Holland 
side.304 Hence, if Bradley and other federalists consider the barriers 
erected in the Eleventh Amendment to protect states from treaty-
based claims, they could argue that federal courts lack jurisdiction 
over claims against states brought under a treaty, not just under 
statute. This would protect states from causes of action under 
treaties.305 
B. Interpreting the Eleventh Amendment 
After two hundred years, scholars and courts still hotly dispute 
the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment. While scholars have 
written articles advancing a variety of theories of the Eleventh 
Amendment,306 two theories presently have currency in the U.S. 
Supreme Court—the “profound shock” and “diversity” theories.307 
The profound shock theory holds that the Eleventh Amendment 
reaffirmed the Framers’ understanding of state sovereign 
immunity.308 The diversity theory holds that the Eleventh 
 
 304. Some federalists might argue more strongly still that the Eleventh Amendment could 
serve as a “specific provision” taproot for state sovereign immunity. That position would be 
tenuous given that the history of the Eleventh Amendment, which serves to identify it as a barrier 
to treaty-making, indicates that it was not intended to enact general sovereign immunity. 
 305. See supra Part II.A. 
 306. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 1559 (2002); Nowak, supra note 173; Pfander, supra note 135. 
 307. For a short explanation of both of these theories, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 198, at 
185–90. For fuller explanations of the theories see, for the diversity theory, Fletcher, supra note 
71;  Fletcher, supra note 12. For the profound shock theory, see WARREN, supra note 12, at 96. 
 308. The Profound Shock Theory creates these outcomes for claims against state defendants. 
 In-State Plaintiff Out-of-State Plaintiff 
Diversity Jurisdiction N/A Barred by 11th Amendment 
Federal Question Jurisdiction Barred by 11th Amendment Barred by 11th Amendment  
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Amendment merely removed the Court’s grant of diversity 
jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution.309 
The foreign policy history of the Eleventh Amendment indicates 
that neither theory is correct. Rather, it indicates that the Eleventh 
Amendment bars all legal and equitable claims made by an out-of-
state plaintiff against a state, regardless of whether the suit is brought 
pursuant to federal question or diversity jurisdiction.310 This meaning 
comports with the political realities of the early and mid-1790s311 
and, not coincidentally, agrees with the “plain language” of the 
Eleventh Amendment.312 
Consider the profound shock theory. According to Judge 
Gibbons, the profound shock theory is the result of a wholly 
inaccurate and politically motivated historical account.313 Gibbons 
 
 309. The Diversity Theory creates these outcomes for claims against state defendants. 
 In-State Plaintiff Out-of-State Plaintiff 
Diversity Jurisdiction N/A Barred by 11th Amendment 
Federal Question Jurisdiction Allowed Allowed  
 310. For a full explanation of this theory, see generally Marshall, supra note 9. This Foreign 
Policy Theory creates these outcomes for claims against state defendants. 
 In-State Plaintiff Out-of-State Plaintiff 
Diversity Jurisdiction N/A Barred by 11th Amendment 
Federal Question Jurisdiction Allowed Barred by 11th Amendment  
 311. Marshall, supra note 9, at 1355. This reading also keeps with John Manning’s argument 
that precise constitutional texts must be read precisely because they are the result of political 
compromises meant to protect constitutional minority positions. See generally John F. Manning, 
The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663 
(2004) (discussing the importance of recognizing the plausibility of selected language as a precise 
compromise in the case of the Eleventh Amendment). 
 312. See Marshall, supra note 9, at 1355. Although I recognize that all language has ambiguity, 
I respectfully submit that the foreign policy history of the Eleventh Amendment comports with a 
reading of the amendment that is much plainer and simpler than that of Hans or diversity 
theorists’. 
 313. Gibbons, supra note 103, at 1893–94, 1989–2002. 
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argues that the Hans Court redefined state sovereign immunity to 
reassure the securities market after the financial and political 
meltdown of Civil War debt repudiation.314 To do so, it invented the 
idea that Chisholm had profoundly shocked the nation’s beliefs in the 
fundamental structure of federalism,315 instead of simply frightening 
the states with the notion that they might have to pay British 
creditors. 
But the Eleventh Amendment probably did not reaffirm a 
generally shared conception of state sovereign immunity.316 The 
profound shock theory of the Eleventh Amendment garners approval 
based on the false fact that the Eleventh Amendment passed quickly 
and with little controversy.317 This account gives short shrift to the 
consideration Congress gave to the amendment, the international 
context of state ratifications, the nuance of Federalist political 
posturing, and the lack of a cohesive vision of state sovereignty 
among the Framers.318 It is true that, shortly after the Justices 
announced their opinions in Chisholm, a U.S. Representative 
proposed an amendment barring suit against states in federal courts 
by any person.319 The next day, a U.S. Senator proposed a similar 
amendment.320 But Congress then tabled the measures for nearly a 
 
 314. Id. at 1989–2002. 
 315. Id. at 2001. 
 316. According to some scholars, the Eleventh Amendment created subject matter 
jurisdiction restrictions on the federal courts despite the Framers’ original understanding of 
sovereign immunity in terms of personal jurisdiction. See generally Nelson, supra note 306. 
Others contend that the narrow and precise formulation of the Eleventh Amendment suggests a 
negative implication for other forms of sovereign immunity. See generally Manning, supra note 
311. 
 317. JACOBS, supra note 133, at 4. 
 318. See generally RAKOVE, supra note 32; WOOD, supra note 129. 
 319. STAHR, supra note 2, at 296. 
 320. Id. 
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year amid decidedly split public and partisan opinion.321 When a 
similar resolution was reintroduced while anti-British sentiments 
simmered over cases filed during the course of the previous year, 
Congress still considered the matter for two months, rejecting a 
series of amendments to the resolution before passing it on to the 
states.322 The states ratified the amendment in a fit of anti-British 
hysteria in the midst of a war crisis and in large part because 
Federalists wanted to maintain or grow political power. Reaction was 
by no means swift or simple.323 
Moreover, the Hans Court’s historical account of Chisholm and of 
the Framers’ conceptions of state sovereignty is almost certainly 
wrong.324 While the Framers at the Constitutional Convention did 
not explicitly consider the key clause, “controversies between a state 
and citizens of another state,” both Justice Wilson’s opinion and U.S. 
Attorney General Edmund Randolph’s argument in Chisholm are 
instructive.325 Both Wilson and Randolph served on the five-member 
committee of detail that wrote the clause;326 both advanced strongly 
Federalist understandings of the Court’s jurisdiction in Chisholm. At 
the Pennsylvania ratification convention, Wilson said, “When a 
citizen has a controversy with another state, there ought to be a 
tribunal where both parties may stand on a just and equal footing.”327 
Edmund Randolph had similarly remarked at the Virginia ratifying 
 
 321. Nowak, supra note 173, at 1435. 
 322. See supra Part III.B–C; 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 30 (1794). 
 323. Even Georgia, the defendant in the case, reacted slowly to Chisholm. Georgia’s House 
only passed legislation nine months after the opinion in Chisholm was handed down. See 5 DHSC, 
supra note 151, at 135. 
 324. Marshall, supra note 9, at 1349–50. 
 325. ORTH, supra note 107, at 23. 
 326. Id. 
 327. As quoted in id. 
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convention that, “I admire that part which forces Virginia to pay her 
debts.”328 
Although the profound shock theory of the Eleventh Amendment 
has held sway for over a century since Hans, in the 1980s and 1990s, 
the diversity theory of the Eleventh Amendment gained currency 
with the Court. Like the profound shock theory, the diversity 
explanation holds that the states ratified the Eleventh Amendment to 
overrule the Court’s holding in Chisholm.329 The diversity theory 
differs from the profound shock theory by positing that the states 
ratified the Eleventh Amendment to accomplish that goal by only 
negating the Court’s claim of state-citizen diversity jurisdiction 
under Article III of the Constitution.330 It posits that the Eleventh 
Amendment does not bar claims brought under federal question or 
other forms of jurisdiction.331 
The principle difficulty with the diversity theory is that it fails to 
address the fact that legislators must have been worried about federal 
claims.332 Diversity theorists posit that original federal question 
 
 328. As quoted in id. Of course, similar remarks were made on the other side of the coin by 
Hamilton in the Federalist papers and by Marshall and Madison at the Virginia ratifying 
convention. Id. at 24–25, 36–37; see JONATHAN ELLIOT, 3 THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF 
THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 533. 
Such statements may not have been entirely true. See Kramer, supra note 12; Massey, supra note 
177, at 95. 
 329. Fletcher, supra note 71, at 1263. 
 330. Id. at 1264 (“In more complicated but precise terms, the amendment required that the 
state-citizen diversity clause be construed to authorize jurisdiction only when the state was a 
plaintiff; when the state was a defendant, the clause was not to be construed to authorize 
jurisdiction.”); Fletcher, supra note 12, at 1035–36. 
 331. Marshall, supra note 9, at 1342–43; contra Pfander, supra note 135, at 1344. Indeed, Jay 
himself struck down state statutes based on the Contract Clause as part of a pattern that alarmed 
state legislatures to growing federal power. STAHR, supra note 2, at 291 n.52. 
 332. See Massey, supra note 177, at 117–19 (discussing the clear desires of Georgia, Virginia, 
and Massachusetts to be free from liability for federal claims). 
04__SCHWAIGER.DOC 11/1/2007  3:54:10 PM 
 
VOL. 2 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW &   PUBLIC POLICY 2007 
 
? 280 ? 
jurisdiction was not established even as a concept during the 1790s.333 
This position is incorrect. Legislators worried about federal 
constitutional claims based on both the Contracts Clause and the Ex 
Post Facto Clause.334 But even if state legislators were not concerned 
that domestic creditors might reframe denied contract claims as 
constitutional claims requiring federal court intervention,335 they 
must have been concerned that foreign creditors would bring federal 
question claims based on the Treaty of Peace.336 State legislatures 
suffered from major anti-British hysteria over potential claims under 
the Treaty of Peace.337 Treaty-based claims were almost certainly 
federal questions;338 surely, they would have been treated as such had 
the Chisholm Court faced the question. 
These treaty-based claims become a large problem for the 
diversity theory when considering assignment of claims.339 
Assignment is the process by which a claim or cause of action can be 
sold or given to another individual, who may then sue on the 
claim.340 Assignment of claims thrived in debt markets during the 
early Federalist Era.  Creditors of states could sell their claims across 
 
 333. Fletcher, supra note 71, at 1264. The Judiciary Act gave the U.S. Supreme Court appellate 
federal question jurisdiction, but made no mention of original federal question jurisdiction. Id. at 
1267–68. 
 334. Marshall, supra note 12, at 1381–82. 
 335. Pfander, supra note 135, at 1344. 
 336. Id. at 1361. 
 337. See supra Part III. 
 338. Fletcher, supra note 71, at 1281. 
 339. Contra Pfander, supra note 135, at 1360–61. In arguing that the Eleventh Amendment 
closed the loophole of assignment and gave control back to state legislatures and state courts, 
Pfander assumes that creditors’ contract claims against states could not have been brought as 
federal questions, an assumption that is at best controversial given the opinions of the federal 
judiciary, and especially those of Chief Justice John Jay. See STAHR, supra note 2, at 291 n.52. 
 340. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 128 (8th ed. 2004) (assuming a claim or cause of action is a 
right or property that can be transferred). 
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borders; much of it concentrated in New York.341 As soon as states 
began repudiating this debt, these claims transformed into federal 
question claims under the Contracts Clause, which prevented states 
from interfering with existing contracts.342 Hence, by selling 
repudiated state debt, private parties could sell federal question 
claims.343 
The diversity theory of the Eleventh Amendment allows federal 
question jurisdiction regardless of whether a plaintiff is in-state or 
out-of-state.344 The primary historical argument for this treatment is 
that it makes no sense to discriminate against out-of-state plaintiffs, 
because they could assign claims to in-state plaintiffs, who could in 
turn bring suit.345 According to diversity theorists, because states 
would still pay in-state plaintiffs who brought federal question claims 
purchased from out-of-state creditors, it is absurd to deny out-of 
state plaintiffs the chance to bring their suits directly via federal 
question jurisdiction.346 
Diversity theorists fail to consider, though, that not all out-of-
state plaintiffs could have assigned claims. British plaintiffs—those 
 
 341. FERGUSON, supra note 116, at 258. Philadelphia and Boston were also centers of 
speculation trade. Id. at 252. 
 342. The True Federalist” to Edmund Randolph, Number III, INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE 
(Boston), Feb. 6, 1794, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 253, 256–57 (“By a piece of artifice, 
the Securities may be nominally transferred out of the State, for the purpose of supporting an 
action in the Federal Court, and will no doubt be thus managed.”) 
 343. This further erodes the historical foundation for the diversity theory of the Eleventh 
Amendment. If out-of-state creditors had federal question claims, a bar to just diversity 
jurisdiction would not have prevented them from bringing suit. I thank Chris Hart for reminding 
me of the point. 
 344. Fletcher, supra note 71, at 1282. 
 345. Id. at 1281; see “The True Federalist” to Edmund Randolph, Number III, reprinted in 5 
DHSC, supra note 342, at 256–57. 
 346. There are some potential reasons under the diversity theory for treating federal question 
claims differently between in-state and out-of-state plaintiffs. Such treatment would profit in-state 
plaintiffs, who could purchase the out-of-state claims. Each state would pay back its debt to its 
own citizens, profiting them rather than out-of-state speculators. 
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most feared financially and politically—were completely or 
effectively barred from assignment. Because of this bar, it was 
reasonable to treat federal question claims differently based on the 
plaintiff’s home. Barring federal question claims by out-of-state 
plaintiffs effectively barred all British creditors’ claims while not 
necessarily affecting American debtholders’ ability to sell their claims 
to in-state plaintiffs. 
British creditors could not assign their claims to in-state 
plaintiffs. Many state laws specifically precluded the sale of property 
by Loyalists, Tories, and British creditors.347 Though legislatures and 
courts relaxed many of these laws after the Revolution, many states 
maintained the de facto denial of rights to Loyalists, Tories, and 
British creditors. In some places, the scope of those denied access to 
courts included even those merely insufficiently patriotic.348 
According to Claude Halstead Van Tyne: 
In the courts of law, not even the rights of a foreigner were left to 
the loyalist. If his neighbors owed him money . . . . All legal action 
was denied him. He might be assaulted, insulted, blackmailed or 
slandered, though the law did not state it so baldly, yet he had no 
recourse in law.349 
Even if a British creditor could legally assign his treaty-based claim, 
he would still face substantial practical obstacles. The first and most 
obvious problem for a British creditor would be finding a local 
American friend in an environment of deep suspicion and 
occasionally violent prejudice.350 Most Americans already harbored a 
 
 347. VAN TYNE, supra note 144, at 275. 
 348. 5 DHSC, supra note 151, at 352–53 (discussing treatment by Massachusetts of William 
Vassall). Indeed, Vassall might have been treated even more poorly than most Loyalists—he was 
not even allowed to return to Massachusetts after Massachusetts began allowing Loyalists to 
return in March 1784. Id. at 357. 
 349. VAN TYNE, supra note 144, at 193. 
 350. JACOBS, supra note 133, at 70–71. 
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great deal of animosity toward creditors who had purchased 
Revolutionary War debt certificates from veterans, orphans, and 
widows at steeply reduced prices.351 Few, if any, Americans would 
have been willing to walk into federal court to seek redress for a 
claim purchased from an opponent of the American Revolution. 
Such an action would risk branding the American as a Loyalist, or at 
least a British sympathizer.352 Additionally, there would be little 
chance of a fair trial even if the British creditor’s claim got into 
court—jurors were drawn from the public and thus shared its 
dispositions, fears, and prejudices.353 Anyone who did not share these 
proclivities would probably have been kept from the jury,354 or, if 
placed on the jury, would feel threatened for supporting British 
claims.355 Attorneys, too, shared anti-British sentiments, not least 
because the bar associations in many states had purged themselves of 
British sympathizers during the Revolution.356 Even the remaining 
attorneys were not safe—after Cornwallis’ surrender, American 
attorneys representing British merchants or Loyalists were physically 
attacked for bringing claims in state courts.357 As if the chances of 
finding a brave and fair-minded jury, judge, and attorney were not 
slim enough, the assignee would also have to enlist the help of 
witnesses, and few witnesses would have been friendly to British 
 
 351. ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 116, at 116–17. 
 352. See generally VAN TYNE, supra note 144. 
 353. Id. at 194. 
 354. Id. (discussing Tories and jury selection during the American Revolution). 
 355. HAROLD M. HYMAN, TO TRY MEN’S SOULS: LOYALTY TESTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 91 
(1960) (discussing that, during the Revolutionary War, “It took a brave grand juror to taint 
himself by freeing persons accused of disloyalty, and an even braver attorney to risk his own 
freedom and career by defending a nonjuring, self-proclaimed ‘enemy to American liberty’”). 
 356. VAN TYNE, supra note 144, at 195–96. 
 357. Holt, supra note 114, at 1440–41. 
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creditors.358 All in all, British creditors would have had a very difficult 
time getting claims successfully assigned and won. 
If the states ratified the Eleventh Amendment to prevent 
enforcement of claims under the Treaty of Peace, the Eleventh 
Amendment should apply to out-of-state plaintiffs bringing either 
federal question claims or diversity claims. Because British creditors 
could not assign their federal question claims under the treaty, such a 
jurisdictional bar would preclude these claims from ever being filed 
in federal court. Contemporaneous understandings of the Eleventh 
Amendment bear out this interpretation.359 Such discrimination 
against out-of-state plaintiffs would have eliminated the most reviled 
claims against the states—those financially large, politically charged 
claims of the British creditors—while not preventing American 
debtholders from assigning their claims to in-state plaintiffs.360 
Under the terms of the Eleventh Amendment, once these in-state 
plaintiffs acquired the federal question claims from out-of-state 
American creditors, they could still bring suit under federal question 
jurisdiction as in-state parties.361 
 
 358. RYERSON, supra note 137, at 169 (discussing how Loyalists lacked friendly American 
witnesses to prove their claims before the British commissions). 
 359. According to the judge: 
[T]he American people have decided, that it is no cause of offence to foreign nations, to 
have their causes decided, and exclusively and finally decided, by the state tribunals. In 
that amendment to the constitution, by which the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts is 
prohibited, in suits brought against the states, by foreign citizens or subjects, this 
construction is most undoubted, and has never been complained of. Since the adoption 
of that amendment, the election of jurisdictions has been entirely taken away from 
foreigners, in all suits against the states, and those suits can, now, be only brought in the 
state courts, in exclusion of every other: and that, too, in cases in which, from the 
circumstance of the states themselves being parties, it might, perhaps, be plausibly 
argued, that the judges of the state courts were not free from bias. 
Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. 1, 23 (1815). 
 360. See supra Part III.D.2. 
 361. See id. 
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V 
CONCLUSION 
The debate between Treaty Power nationalists and Treaty Power 
federalists has been ongoing since the Framing. Today, Treaty Power 
nationalists rely on a vision of state sovereign immunity that does not 
gel with the history of the Eleventh Amendment. On the other side, 
Treaty Power federalists ignore the foreign policy history of how the 
Eleventh Amendment changed the Treaty Power, even though that 
history would substantially bolster their position. By protecting states 
from foreign creditors with potential claims based on the Treaty of 
Peace, the Eleventh Amendment nullified specific provisions of the 
treaty and prevented the President and Senate from trading the keys 
to state treasuries for peace with Britain in the Jay Treaty. In doing 
so, the Eleventh Amendment altered the contours of the national-
state balance of the Constitution, especially as it relates to the Treaty 
Power. Because the Eleventh Amendment delimits the Treaty Power, 
federalists need not try to limit it by constructing an abstraction of 
federalism based on the “invisible radiations” of the Tenth 
Amendment or implicit constitutional structures. Treaty Power 
federalists should instead rely on the very visible radiations of the 
Eleventh Amendment. 
The often-ignored history of the Eleventh Amendment as a 
reaction to the Treaty of Peace indicates that the Treaty Power is a 
wholly inappropriate vehicle with which to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity. It also indicates that the Eleventh Amendment might well 
mean what it says. In a calculated move to cut off British creditors 
from federal courts, the states ratified the Eleventh Amendment to 
take away the federal judiciary’s constitutional grant of diversity and 
federal question jurisdiction when out-of-state plaintiffs sue states, 
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but left in-state plaintiffs with the capacity to bring federal question 
claims against states. 
